How Much Do We Value Research and Development?: Broadening the Experimental Use Exemption to Patent Infringement in Light of Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) by Sandstrom, Kevin
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 30 | Issue 3 Article 9
2004
How Much Do We Value Research and
Development?: Broadening the Experimental Use
Exemption to Patent Infringement in Light of
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d
860 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
Kevin Sandstrom
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Sandstrom, Kevin (2004) "How Much Do We Value Research and Development?: Broadening the Experimental Use Exemption to
Patent Infringement in Light of Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003)," William Mitchell Law
Review: Vol. 30: Iss. 3, Article 9.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/9
SANDSTROM - FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004 11:38 PM 
 
1059 
NOTE: HOW MUCH DO WE VALUE RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT?: BROADENING THE EXPERIMENTAL 
USE EXEMPTION TO PATENT INFRINGEMENT IN 
LIGHT OF INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES I, LTD. v. MERCK 
KGAA, 331 F.3D 860 (FED. CIR. 2003) 
Kevin Sandstrom† 
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................... 1059 
II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................ 1061 
A. The Experimental Use Exemption..................................1061 
B. FDA Approval Safe Harbor Provision— 
  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).......................................1068 
III. INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES I, LTD. V. MERCK KGAA...................... 1079 
A. Background............................................................... 1079 
B. Holding .................................................................... 1080 
IV. ANALYSIS ................................................................................... 1085 
A. The FDA Approval Safe Harbor Provision—  
  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).......................................1085 
B. Common-Law Experimental Use Exemption ................... 1087 
C. Combining the Experimental Use Exemption and 
  FDA Approval Safe Harbor Provision.................. 1109 
V. CONCLUSION.............................................................................. 1111 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1800s, courts have recognized but seldom used 
a common-law exemption to patent infringement now known as 
the research or experimental use exemption.1  This exemption to 
infringement allows one party to use another party’s patented 
invention “merely for philosophical experiments, or for the 
purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the [invention] to 
 
† B.S. in Chemical Engineering, magna cum laude, 2002, University of 
Minnesota-Twin Cities; J.D. expected 2005, William Mitchell College of Law. 
 1. See 5 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[1][a]-[b] (2002). 
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produce its described effects.”2 
In 1984, following the Federal Circuit’s decision in Roche 
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.,3 Congress enacted 35 
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
approval safe harbor provision to patent infringement.4  Section 
271(e)(1) allows a generic drug manufacturer to make or import 
and then use another company’s patented drug during the patent 
term—activities that would otherwise infringe the patent—to 
conduct the clinical studies required for the manufacturer to gain 
FDA approval for its generic form of the patented drug.5  This safe 
harbor enables a generic drug manufacturer to begin selling its 
version of a drug immediately after the patent expires because FDA 
approval will already have been obtained.6  Without it, the patent 
holder would receive a virtual extension on its patent term of 
several months or even years while the generic companies 
attempted to gain FDA approval on their generic forms of the 
drug.7 
 
 2. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D.  Mass. 1813) (No. 
17,600). 
 3. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1984). 
 4. CHISUM, supra note 1, § 16.03[1][d].  In addition to the FDA approval safe 
harbor, the 1984 enactment, known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act” also included the 
extension of patent terms and filing of “abbreviate new drug applications” among 
other provisions.  See infra Part II.B. 
 5. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003). The language of § 271(e)(1) states: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell 
within the United States or import into the United States a patented 
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. 
Id. 
The FDA approval safe harbor has been extended to include implantable medical 
devices, food additives, color additives, and human biological products, as those 
products also require FDA approval.  See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 
661, 674 (1990).  The exception has also been applied to activities that the courts 
have deemed to be “reasonably related” to seeking FDA approval, such as business 
development and promotional activity that may be necessary to begin the FDA 
approval process and is necessary to be able to effectively market the product 
immediately after the patent term ends.  See Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc. 775 
F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating for the typical products requiring 
FDA approval “that are extremely sophisticated, that will carry a large price tag . . . 
and that are very expensive to develop, potential competitors foreseeably must 
engage in considerable ‘business’ development and promotion activity just to meet 
the FDA’s requirements, let alone to be in a position to market their products 
meaningfully when [the patent term ends]”). 
 6. See CHISUM, supra note 1, § 16.03[1][d]. 
 7. See Roche Prods., 733 F.2d at 864 (noting “[a] recent study indicated that it 
2
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In its recent Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA decision,8 
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decided that neither the 
experimental use exemption nor the FDA approval safe harbor 
provision allowed Merck to use Integra’s patented drug to conduct 
research and develop a completely different and more useful drug.9  
The Federal Circuit has severely limited the usefulness of either 
exception to the disappointment of the dissenting Judge 
Newman.10 
This note argues Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA should 
be overturned to allow the use of a patented drug to create 
different derivative products or to compare and evaluate a new 
product against the latest patented standard.  Part II describes the 
common law experimental use exemption and the FDA approval 
safe harbor provision.11  Part III reviews the facts, holding, and 
dissent in Integra.12  Part IV analyzes Integra in light of the 
experimental use exemption and FDA approval safe harbor 
provision.13  Finally, this note concludes by proposing that the 
experimental use exemption to patent infringement should be 
broadened to allow all scientific research on patented subject 
matter to comport with the patent specification’s full disclosure 
requirement and further the patent law principles of promoting 
innovation and rapid technological development.14 
II. BACKGROUND 
A.  The Experimental Use Exemption  
The common-law experimental use exemption excuses a 
potential patent infringer who uses a patented invention only for 
intellectual, non-commercial research.15  The exemption has been 
mentioned regularly in case law but seldom applied to exempt a 
 
now can take on average from 7 to 10 years for a pharmaceutical company to [gain 
FDA approval]”). 
 8. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 9. Id. at 864 n.2, 867-68. 
 10. Id. at 872-78 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part III. 
 13. See infra Part IV. 
 14. See infra Part V. 
 15. Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use 
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 
(2001). 
3
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defendant from patent infringement.16  In recent years, there has 
been a fair amount of scholarly debate about the experimental use 
exemption and whether it should be broadened.17  Congress has 
even proposed legislation, albeit unsuccessfully, to create a 
statutory experimental use exemption.18  In modern case law, the 
common-law experimental use exemption is well established, but it 
remains weak and underutilized.19 
1.  Origin of the Experimental Use Exemption 
The experimental use exemption can be traced to 1813 when 
Justice Story handed down the famous Whittemore v. Cutter 
decision.20  Justice Story reasoned that “it could never have been 
the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed 
[another’s patented invention] merely for philosophical 
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of 
[the patented invention] to produce its described effects.”21  The 
term “philosophical experiments” in Justice Story’s opinion has 
 
 16. Id. 
 17. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive 
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg, 
Patents]; Jennifer Miller, Sealing the Coffin on the Experimental Use Exception, 2003 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12; Mueller, supra note 15; Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a 
Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000); Gregory N. Pate, 
Analysis of the Experimental Use Exception, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 253 (2002); Arti Kaur 
Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 
94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999); John A. Tessensohn, Reversal of Fortune—
Pharmaceutical Experimental Use and Patent Infringement in Japan, 4 J. INT’L LEGAL 
STUD. 1 (1998); Eyal H. Barash, Comment, Experimental Uses, Patents, and Scientific 
Progress, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 667 (1997); Jennifer A. Johnson, Comment, The 
Experimental Use Exception in Japan: A Model for U.S. Patent Law?, 12 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 499 (2003); Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement: 
The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169 (1991). 
 18. H.R. REP. NO. 101-960, pt. I (1990).  The “Patent Competitiveness and 
Technological Innovation Act of 1990” proposed a broad experimental use 
exemption and was supported by the House Judiciary committee, but was not 
enacted by Congress.  Id.  See also Johnson, supra note 17, at 528-29.  A 1988 bill on 
patenting transgenic animals also originally included an experimental use 
exemption, but the exemption was later removed from the bill.  Id.  Upon 
removing the exemption, the House Report suggested instead that sometime in 
the future, Congress should enact an experimental use exemption that applies to 
all inventions.  Id.; H.R. REP. No. 100-888, at 51 (1988). 
 19. CHISUM, supra note 1, § 16.03[1]. 
 20. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600); See also CHISUM, supra 
note 1, § 16.03[1][a]. 
 21. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121. 
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/9
SANDSTROM - FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004  11:38 PM 
2004]  EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION 1063 
come to mean “scientific experiments” in modern usage.22  Justice 
Story used identical reasoning in the case of Sawin v. Guild,23 which 
was decided in the same year as Whittemore.  The Whittemore and 
Sawin decisions are credited with creating the experimental use 
exemption.24  However, since 1813, the experimental use 
exemption has been only infrequently applied as a true exception 
to patent infringement.25 
In the earlier first half of the twentieth century, a few courts 
recognized the doctrine.  A 1935 Colorado district court in Ruth v. 
Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co.26 excused the defendant’s 
manufacture and sale of parts for a patented machine to the 
Colorado School of Mines because the school used the machines 
only for experimental purposes.27  The court held that the “making 
or using of a patented invention merely for experimental purposes, 
without any intent to derive profits or practical advantage 
therefrom, is not infringement.”28  Two years later in Akro Agate Co. 
v. Master Marble Co.,29 a West Virginia district court held that use of 
a patented feature of a competitor’s marble-making machine for 
“experimental testing by defendants . . . for a brief period before 
going into commercial production, . . . [with a different 
machine] . . . was not in law an act of infringement as marbles were 
not commercially sold.”30 
Subsequently, courts applied the exemption and established it 
as a defense to patent infringement.  In 1944, the Southern District 
Court of New York held in Dugan v. Lear Avia31 that the 
experimental use exemption applied to one of the defendant’s 
accused devices because “it affirmatively appeared, without 
contradiction by plaintiff, that defendant built that device only 
 
 22. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 n.8 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting) (explaining the modern translation of the 
term “philosophical experiments” as scientific experiments). 
 23. 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391) (stating “the making 
of a patented machine to be an offence within the purview of it, must be the 
making with an intent to use for profit, and not for the mere purpose of 
philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the 
specification”). 
 24. See CHISUM, supra note 1, § 16.03[1][a]. 
 25. See id. 
 26. 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935), rev’d, 87 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1936). 
 27. Id. at 703. 
 28. Id. at 713. 
 29. 18 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. W. Va. 1937). 
 30. Id. at 333. 
 31. 55 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff’d, 156 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1946). 
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experimentally and that it has neither manufactured it for sale nor 
sold any.”32  In 1958, the Court of Claims held in Chesterfield v. 
United States33 that the United States was not liable for infringement 
of Chesterfield’s patented metal alloy.34  The court held that “the 
evidence shows that the portion of the [patented] alloy procured 
by the defendant was used only for testing and for experimental 
purposes, and there is no evidence that the remainder was used 
other than experimentally.”35 
2.  Restrictions on the Experimental Use Exemption 
Courts have limited the experimental use exemption doctrine 
when the infringer’s experimental use was coupled with 
commercial exploitation or is linked to the infringer’s business 
interests.  Although several cases have applied the experimental use 
exemption, many more have decided that it was inapplicable due to 
the commercial nature of the defendant’s use.36  In one case, the 
defendant’s claim that its use of a patent was “experimental only, 
incidental to their search for a new [method for extracting pearl 
essence] which they claim to have discovered” was rejected because 
the defendant sold the pearl essence resulting from the 
experiments.37  In another case, a defendant used a patented 
method for freezing fish while on a commercial fishing 
expedition.38  The defendant claimed that its use was “only for the 
purpose of experimentation as to the desirability of using this 
method” and that defendant “reached the conclusion that it was 
not necessary to use the patented method in order to get 
satisfactory freezing.”39  The Ninth Circuit held the experimental 
 
 32. Id. at 229 (citing Bonsack Mach. Co. v. Underwood, 73 F. 206, 211 
(C.C.E.D.N.C. 1896)). 
 33. 159 F. Supp. 371 (Ct. Cl. 1958). 
 34. Id. at 375. 
 35. Id.  The court found that claims of the two patents at issue relating to the 
metal alloys were anticipated by prior art and were invalid, but even if they were 
valid, were not infringed due to the experimental use exemption.  Id.  The court 
clearly notes that “[e]xperimental use does not infringe.”  Id. 
 36. See CHISUM, supra note 1, § 16.03[1][b] (citing at least twelve cases where 
research or experimental use exemption is noted but still holding defendant liable 
for infringement due to the commercial nature of the use). 
 37. Pairpearl Prods., Inc. v. Joseph H. Meyer Bros., 58 F.2d 802, 804-05 (D. 
Me. 1932). 
 38. Spray Refrigeration Co. v. Sea Spray Fishing, Inc., 322 F.2d 34, 35 (9th 
Cir. 1963). 
 39. Id. at 36 (noting the patented method was used only on one or two 
6
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use exemption did not exempt an experimental use that was 
coupled with commercial exploitation.40 
The trial court decisions of Douglas v. United States41 and 
Pitcairn v. United States42 further exemplify limitations of the 
common-law doctrine.  The Douglas court held that the 
experimental use exemption had not “been permitted where there 
was a pattern of systematic exploitation . . . of the accused devices 
for the purpose of furthering the legitimate interests of the user.”43  
In Pitcairn, the government purchased helicopters that infringed 
the plaintiff’s patents.44  Based on the experimental use exemption, 
the government argued that any aircraft used for testing, 
evaluation, demonstrational, or experimental purposes should be 
excluded from the plaintiff’s compensation.45  The court agreed 
that testing new aircraft was necessary to ensure they worked 
properly, but because such tests were intended to further the 
legitimate business interests of the user they were not excluded 
from infringement.46  Both Douglas and Pitcairn limited the 
usefulness of the experimental use exemption if the infringing 
research is to promote a legitimate business interest of the 
infringer. 
In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co.,47 the Federal 
Circuit refused to apply the experimental use doctrine when a 
 
voyages). 
 40. Id. at 36-37.  The defendant cited Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 
371 (Ct. Cl. 1958) and Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) for 
the proposition that its use was an experimental use exempt from infringement.  
Id. at 36.  The court disagreed and noted that neither Chesterfield nor Dugan 
involved an “experimental use coupled with a commercial use.”  Id. 
 41. 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1974) aff’d on other grounds at 
510 F.2d 364 (Ct. Cl. 1975). The Court of Claims affirmed on the grounds that the 
patent was invalid and did not reach the issue of experimental use.  See 510 F.2d 
364 (Ct. Cl. 1975). 
 42. 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 35 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1975) (affirming and adopting 
the trial court’s decision regarding the experimental use issue). 
 43. 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 177 (“At no time were the accused devices used for 
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for philosophical inquiry; to the contrary, 
each use was in keeping with the legitimate business of the using agency and 
served a valuable governmental and public purpose”). 
 44. 188 U.S.P.Q. at 47.  The government purchased seven models of 
helicopters that infringed fifty-nine claims in eleven of the plaintiff’s patents.  Id. 
at 35, 47. 
 45. Id. at 47.  The government claimed that ninety-three of 2237 aircraft 
involved in the litigation were used for experimental purposes and thus should be 
excluded from plaintiff’s compensation.  Id. at 46. 
 46. Id. at 47. 
 47. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
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generic drug manufacturer made and used a patented drug to 
perform experimental tests to gain FDA approval before the patent 
term ended.48  Although Bolar argued its tests were “true scientific 
inquiries,” the court stated “[w]e cannot construe the experimental 
use rule so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the 
guise of ‘scientific inquiry,’ when that inquiry has definite, 
cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.”49  The 
Roche court severely weakened the experimental use exemption by 
construing it as “truly narrow.”50  Although the specific rule as 
applied to the case’s facts has been overruled by 35 U.S.C. § 
271(e)(1),51 the court’s very narrow interpretation of the 
experimental use exemption has lived on. 
More recent cases also have narrowed the scope of the 
experimental use exemption, refusing to apply it in cases where the 
infringer has a commercial or profitable intention.  For example, 
in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,52 Service Engineering used 
Embrex’s patented methods to test their prototype machine and to 
solicit orders for their machine.53  Both the district court and the 
Federal Circuit agreed that, although its uses were experimental in 
nature, Service Engineering’s ultimate goal was commercialization.  
The Federal Circuit held that uses for research or experimental 
purposes coupled with intent to profit or commercialize would not 
be deemed experimental only.54 
 
 48. See id. at 863; see also infra Part II.B (explaining how the decision of Roche 
Products, Inc. prompted the congressional enactment of the FDA approval safe 
harbor, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), among other provisions). 
 49. Roche Prods., Inc. 733 F.2d at 863.  The court refused to allow “exploitation 
of a patented invention for the purpose of furthering the legitimate business 
interests of the infringer” under an experimental use exemption.  Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See infra Part II.B. 
 52. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 53. Id. at 1346-47. 
 54. Id. at 1349 (stating the experimental use exemption does not apply when 
a “particular use ‘in the guise of “scientific inquiry’ ” had ‘definite, cognizable, and 
not insubstantial commercial purposes.’ ”) (quoting Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar 
Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).  In a concurring opinion, Judge 
Rader went further, stating that: “the Patent Act leaves no room for any de minimis 
or experimental use excuses for infringement . . . . When infringement is proven 
either minimal or wholly non-commercial, the damage computation process 
provides full flexibility for courts to preclude large (or perhaps any) awards for 
minimal infringements.”  Embrex, Inc., 216 F.3d at 1352.  See also Infigen, Inc. v. 
Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 981 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (holding 
research with the remote prospect of future commercial success cannot be an 
exempt experimental use). 
8
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In Madey v. Duke University,55 the Federal Circuit reiterated that 
an experimental use that is “in any way commercial in nature” 
would not be exempted from infringement by the experimental 
use exemption.56  Duke University’s use appeared to be only for 
research and education,57 which seemingly fits within the oft-noted 
“philosophical experiments” category from the very first 
experimental use case.58  The Federal Circuit held, however, that 
because Duke’s business is education, Duke’s use of the patented 
invention to educate students had a commercial purpose and was 
not exempt under the experimental use exemption.59  Even though 
education may be what Justice Story had in mind when he 
mentioned “philosophical experiments” on the patented invention 
as being exempt from infringement in 1813,60 today’s courts have 
decided that even educational research does not fall within the 
experimental use exemption. 
The experimental use exemption is a nearly 200-year-old 
defense to a patent infringement action.  Traditionally, courts 
narrowly construed and infrequently allowed it.  Recently, however, 
cases have interpreted the experimental use exemption so narrowly 
as to nearly eliminate it. 
 
 55. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 56. Id. at 1362. 
 57. Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 423 (M.D.N.C. 2001) 
(“Plaintiff concedes that the overwhelming majority of Defendant’s uses of the 
patented devices were for academic or experimental purposes . . . ”). 
 58. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 
17,600) (creating the experimental use rule and defining the rule as applying to 
uses “merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the 
sufficiency of the [invention] to produce its described effects”). 
 59. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63.  The court stated: 
[O]ur precedent does not immunize any conduct that is in keeping 
with the alleged infringer’s legitimate business, regardless of 
commercial implications. For example, major research universities, 
such as Duke, often sanction and fund research projects with arguably 
no commercial application whatsoever. However, these projects 
unmistakably further the institution’s legitimate business objectives, 
including educating and enlightening students and faculty 
participating in these projects. These projects also serve, for example, 
to increase the status of the institution and lure lucrative research 
grants, students and faculty . . . . [T]he district court attached too great 
a weight to the non-profit, educational status of Duke, effectively 
suppressing the fact that Duke’s acts appear to be in accordance with 
any reasonable interpretation of Duke’s legitimate business objectives. 
Id. 
 60. See supra Part II.A.1. 
9
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B.  FDA Approval Safe Harbor Provision—35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 
1.  The Roche Decision 
In its 1984 Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.61 
decision, the Federal Circuit held that a generic drug 
manufacturer’s infringing use of a patented drug for clinical trials 
to gain FDA approval did not fall within the experimental use 
exemption.62  Bolar wanted to begin marketing its generic version 
of Roche’s patented sleep aid, Dalmane, as soon as possible.63  
Bolar refused to wait until Roche’s patent expired on January 17, 
1984 to begin clinical trials because speed to market was vital to the 
success of the generic drug and the FDA approval process could 
take upwards of two years.64  Bolar purchased a quantity of Dalmine 
from a foreign manufacturer in mid-1983 and began the necessary 
testing for FDA approval.65  Roche filed an infringement suit 
against Bolar.66  The district court held in favor of the defendant 
Bolar, reasoning that the experimental use exemption applied to 
Bolar’s infringing use.67  The Federal Circuit reversed, holding “the 
experimental use exception to be truly narrow,” and refused to 
expand it to include Bolar’s activities, holding that Bolar’s “use is 
solely for business reasons.”68 
 
 61. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 62. Id.  See also supra Part II.A. for a discussion of the common-law 
experimental use exemption to patent infringement. 
 63. Id. at 860. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 572 F. Supp. 255, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983).  The district court reasoned: 
[This] court cannot find a basis for holding that Bolar’s limited 
experimental use . . . constitute[s] infringement. First, Bolar realizes 
no benefit during the term of the patent; its activities are in no way 
connected with current manufacture or sale here or abroad. Nor do its 
activities lessen Roche’s profits during the patent’s term. Second, post-
expiration delay in competition unintentionally imposed by FDA 
regulation is not a right or benefit granted by the patent law. This 
court will not act to protect a right or benefit that is without legal basis. 
Third, Roche can point to no substantial harm it will suffer from 
Bolar’s FDA studies before the patent expires. Bolar’s threatened 
activity is at best de minimis and will not support an action for 
infringement. 
Id. 
 68. Roche Prods., Inc., 733 F.2d at 863. 
10
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The court recognized that the lengthy FDA approval process 
granted a virtual extension of the patent term to holders of a drug 
patent.69  However, the court declined to “engage in legislative 
activity proper only for the Congress.”70 
2.  Congressional Reaction to Roche 
In response to Roche, Congress enacted the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known 
as the “Hatch-Waxman Act.”71  The Hatch-Waxman Act overturned 
the ruling in Roche by enacting the FDA approval safe harbor 
provision, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), among many other 
provisions.72  Section 271(e)(1) allows a generic drug manufacturer 
to make and use a patented drug during the patent term in order 
to seek FDA approval for its generic form of the drug.73 
 
 69. Id. at 863-64.  The term of the drug patent is skewed at both the 
beginning and the end.  Id. at 864.  The FDA approval process can take, in some 
instances, seven to ten years.  Id.  At the beginning of the term, the patent 
generally issues before FDA approval is received, so that the patentee must 
conduct significant amounts of testing for the FDA before the drug can be 
marketed, eating up a portion of the patent term.  Id.  At the end of the patent 
term, if generic manufacturers are restricted from starting the FDA approval 
process until after the patent term ends, then the patentee gains an effective 
extension of the patent term past the expiration date of the patent while the 
generic manufacturers complete the FDA approval process.  Id.  However, these 
two distortions are rarely equivalent and the patent owner either loses part of its 
patent monopoly or gains additional monopoly time.  Id. 
 70. Id. at 863-64. 
 71. Pub. L. No. 98-417, Title II, 98 Stat. 1585 (Sept. 24, 1984). 
 72. In addition to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), the Hatch-Waxman Act included 
provisions for: 1) extension of drug patent terms, under 35 U.S.C. § 156, for the 
amount of time it takes the patent owner to gain FDA approval; 2) authorization 
for the filing of “Abbreviated New Drug Applications” (ANDAs) under 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j); and 3) a special patent infringement remedy for a patent owner when a 
generic manufacturer files an ANDA seeking FDA approval before the patent 
covering the product has expired.  See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction 
and Application of Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) 
(Codified as Amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 and 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e) (1994)), 180 
A.L.R. FED. 487 (2002).  The ANDA simplifies the FDA approval process for 
generic manufacturers by allowing them to piggyback on the information already 
submitted by the patent owner and approved by the FDA regarding clinical trials 
on humans and labeling requirements.  Id.  Thus the FDA approval process for 
generic manufacturers is made faster, easier, and cheaper.  Id. 
 73. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003).  The relevant text of § 271(e)(1) states: 
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell 
within the United States or import into the United States a patented 
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
11
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Public policy strongly favors allowing generic manufacturers to 
receive FDA approval as early as possible so that the cheaper 
generic form of a drug will be available to consumers immediately 
after the patent term ends.74  The Hatch-Waxman Act filled in 
where the Federal Circuit in Roche had refused to concede to 
Bolar’s public policy argument and “engage in legislative activity.”75  
However, the Hatch-Waxman Act also provided to the patentee a 
corresponding extension of the patent term for the length of time 
the patentee takes to gain FDA approval by also enacting 35 U.S.C. 
§ 156.76  This provision ensures that the patentee is not penalized 
by the FDA approval process and still receives a full twenty years of 
patent protection.77 
3.  Effects of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) and 35 U.S.C. § 156 
The FDA approval safe harbor provision under 35 U.S.C. 
§ 271(e)(1) and the patent term extension for the patent owner 
under 35 U.S.C. § 156 eliminate the “distortion” at the beginning 
and end of the patent term due to the FDA approval process.78  At 
the beginning of the patent term, the patentee must seek FDA 
approval.79  During this time, the patentee is unable to sell its 
product commercially, so the patent term is effectively shortened 
 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products. 
Id. 
Note that § 271(e)(2) qualifies the language of § 271(e)(1) by stating: “It shall be 
an act of infringement . . . if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval 
under such Act to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a 
[patented] drug . . . before the expiration of the patent.”  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) 
(2003). 
 74. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 405 (Fed. Cir. 
1989), aff’d, 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (finding that “if [generic drug manufacturers] 
had to wait to begin testing until after a patent expired, [that would give] an 
effective extension of the patent term, which was contrary to the interests of the 
public in obtaining lower cost drugs as soon as possible”). 
 75. See supra notes 47-51, 61-70 and accompanying text. 
 76. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-417, Title II, 98 Stat. 1585 (Sept. 24, 1984).  See also 35 U.S.C. § 156 
(2003). 
 77. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2003).  Section 156 provides a patent term extension 
for “drug products” as well as “any medical device, food additive, or color additive 
subject to regulation under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.”  Id. at (f).  
The extension is based upon the “regulatory review period before [the product’s] 
commercial marketing or use.”  Id. at (a)(4). 
 78. Eli Lilly & Co., 496 U.S. at 670 (1990). 
 79. Id. at 669. 
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by the amount of time it takes the patentee to gain FDA approval.80  
Section 156 allows the patent term to be extended by the amount 
of time it takes the patentee to gain FDA approval. 81 
At the end of the patent term, the generic manufacturer must 
gain FDA approval for its generic equivalent.82  If the generic 
manufacturer must wait until the patent expires before starting 
FDA approval, then the patentee can continue to sell its product 
without any competition past the end of the patent term while the 
generic manufacturers work through the FDA approval process.83  
Section 271(e)(1) allows the generic competitor to make the 
otherwise infringing generic equivalent during the patent term to 
gain FDA approval before the patent expires.84  Thus, the 
combination of § 156 and § 271(e)(1) ensure not only that generic 
drugs are available immediately after the patent expires, but also 
ensure that the patentee receives a uniform twenty years on its 
patent term.85 
4.  Judicial Interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 
The awkward wording of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)—“solely for uses 
reasonably related to the development and submission of 
information . . .”86—has caused interpretive problems for the 
courts.  The strict term “solely” seems to contradict the more lax 
phrase, “reasonably related” and this contradiction has led to 
conflicting results in early cases interpreting the statute, although 
the conflict seems to be resolved.87 
Not long after the statute’s enactment, the U.S. District Court 
for the Northern District of California, in Scripps Clinic & Research 
 
 80. Id. at 669-70. 
 81. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2003). 
 82. Eli Lilly & Co., 496 U.S. at 670. 
 83. Id. 
 84. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003). 
 85. See Eli Lilly & Co., 496 U.S. at 669-71 (discussing in detail how the Drug 
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 eliminates the 
“distortion” at the beginning and end of the patent term for products requiring 
FDA approval).  Note that under 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) the current patent term is 
twenty years, whereas at the time of the Eli Lilly decision the term was seventeen 
years.  Id.  As of June 8, 1995, the patent term changed from seventeen years from 
the date of patent issuance to twenty years from the date of filing the patent 
application in order to correspond with other countries’ patent laws.  Merck & 
Co., v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 86. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (emphasis added). 
 87. See CHISUM, supra note 1, § 16.03[1][d][iii]. 
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Foundation v. Genentech, Inc.,88 strictly construed the language of § 
271(e)(1).  The court held that any use of a patented drug not 
solely related to FDA approval would not be exempt from 
infringement.89  Genentech’s use of Scripps’ patented drug was 
probably reasonably related to FDA approval, but it was also related 
to preparation of a European patent application and development 
of a process for manufacturing the drug on a commercial scale, 
and thus the use was not “solely” related to FDA approval.  
Therefore, Genentech’s use of the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor was 
denied.90 
However, in 1989, the U.S. District Court of Delaware in Scripps 
Clinic & Research Foundation v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc.91 
analyzed the same patent on similar facts, but came to a different 
conclusion.92  Baxter had submitted clinical data that it had 
gathered not only to the FDA, but also to foreign regulatory 
agencies. 93  Scripps moved to strike Baxter’s § 271(e)(1) defense 
on the basis that Baxter’s use was not solely for submission of data 
to the FDA.94  Although the court denied the motion because it felt 
that the case needed a more developed record, it also stated that 
“[t]he question of law . . . is whether any foreign activities can be 
‘reasonably related’ to FDA drug approval.”95  The court focused on 
the “reasonably related” language of § 271(e)(1), whereas Scripps v. 
 
 88. 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified on other grounds, 678 F. Supp. 
1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988) and 707 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in 
part, vacated in part, and remanded on other grounds, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 89. Id. at 1396. 
 90. Id.  The court states, “Even if the uses . . . were reasonably related to 
meeting FDA requirements, they certainly were not solely related to that 
purpose . . . . [Genentech’s] sales and uses of [the patented drug], serving 
multiple purposes unrelated to meeting FDA requirements, clearly lie beyond the 
protection of § 271(e)(1).” 
 91. 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1562 (D. Del. 1989). 
 92. Id. at 1565. 
 93. Id. at 1564-65. 
 94. Id.  Scripps put forth multiple arguments against Baxter’s FDA approval 
safe harbor defense, including that 1) Baxter had made a motion on the defense 
earlier and withdrew the motion, thus eliminating the defense; 2) Baxter had 
distinguished the defense from “the merits” of the case, thus eliminating the 
defense; 3) a similar defense was dismissed by the District Court for the Northern 
District of California in an unrelated case; and 4) Baxter had filed for regulatory 
approval in foreign countries, and thus the uses were not solely for FDA approval.  
The court summarily dismissed all of Scripp’s arguments except for the foreign 
use argument.  Id. 
 95. Id. at 1565. 
14
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Genentech had focused on “solely” just two years before.96  As will be 
seen, subsequent decisions also seem to agree with the District 
Court of Delaware’s focus on the “reasonably related” language. 
5.  Expanding the Safe Harbor Provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 
Many of the subsequent cases applying § 271(e)(1) involve 
determining just how far the safe harbor should extend.  In 1990, 
the scope of § 271(e)(1) was greatly expanded when the Supreme 
Court held in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc.97 that the exemption 
should also apply to medical devices that require FDA approval.98  
The Court held in a 6-2 decision99 that “[t]he phrase ‘patented 
invention’ in § 271(e)(1) is defined to include all inventions, not 
drug-related inventions alone.”100  The court also held that not only 
does the Hatch-Waxman Act apply to drugs and medical devices, 
but rationally to any product requiring regulatory approval under 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which also 
includes food additives and color additives.101  The Supreme Court 
reasoned that Congress would have logically intended the safe 
harbor provision to include other products requiring FDA 
approval, as those other products would encounter the same 
distortions at the beginning and end of the patent term due to the 
FDA approval process.102 
In 1991, the Northern District of California broadly construed 
§ 271(e)(1) when it held in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.103 that 
 
 96. See id.  The court noted the Scripps v. Genentech decision and its focus on 
the term “solely” but was disinclined to follow that rule, stating: 
Judge Schwarzer of the Northern District of California dismissed a 
similar defense raised by Genentech, Inc., based on similar facts, in 
another patent infringement suit brought by Scripps Clinic. Scripps 
Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379, 
1395-97 (N.D. Cal. 1987). It argues that this proves that Baxter’s 
defense [§ 271(e)(1)] is insufficient. That case, however, is not 
controlling in this Court . . . . Judge Schwarzer was faced with this issue, 
but he interpreted the statute to only cover activities that were “solely 
related” to FDA approval and did not consider what acts are 
“reasonably related” to it. 
Id. at 1564-65. 
 97. 496 U.S. 661 (1990). 
 98. Id. at 673-74. 
 99. Justice O’Connor took no part in the case.  Id. at 661. 
 100. Id. at 665. 
 101. Id. at 671-72. 
 102. Id. at 668-69. 
 103. 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
15
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activities by the non-patentee Ventritex were “reasonably related” 
to gaining FDA approval.104  Ventritex’s activities included: 
demonstrating the device at medical/scientific conferences or 
trade shows to solicit clinical investigators, relying on descriptions 
of the device to raise capital, publishing articles about the device, 
and using data gathered from clinical trials to gain import approval 
from foreign governments.105  The court held that although these 
activities did not directly create data for gaining FDA approval, the 
activities were necessary to promote Ventritex’s business in its quest 
for FDA approval and thus were reasonably related to gaining FDA 
approval.106 
Many of Ventritex’s activities did not involve making, using, or 
selling the patented device, so they were not technically infringing 
acts. 107  Furthermore, the court held that these non-infringing 
activities, although commercial in nature and not related to FDA 
approval, did not eliminate the safe harbor provision for 
Ventritex’s other infringing activities that were reasonably related to 
 
(non-precedential). 
 104. Id. at 1289. 
 105. Id. at 1281. 
 106. Id.  The district court also noted that Congress, in enacting § 271(e)(1), 
not only wanted generic manufacturers to gain FDA approval before the patent 
expired, but also likely intended the companies to “engage in a range of business 
activities (like raising capital, establishing mechanisms for product distribution, 
etc.)” so they could “enter the commercial market in a significant way immediately 
after a patent expired . . . .”  Id. at 1278. 
 107. Id. at 1281.  The court states that: 
[O]ur inquiry should be confined to “uses” that would be infringing 
but for the exemption, these collateral, non-infringing, activities are 
not relevant . . . .  [T]he use of clinical data, in a prospectus or 
otherwise, is not an infringing act . . . Moreover, the fact that this non-
infringing activity reveals a commercial “purpose” unrelated to 
obtaining FDA approval cannot provide a basis for denial of the 
exemption . . . . [T]hese activities are important means for Ventritex to 
position itself to enter the marketplace if the Cadence ever receives 
FDA approval. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The court also states: “the exemption . . . is not lost simply as a result of a showing 
that the defendant has engaged in non-infringing acts whose ‘uses’ fall outside 
those permitted by the statute.” Id. at 1278 (emphasis in original).  See also 
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1523-24 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (stating that demonstrations of a patented medical device at medical 
conferences for purposes of soliciting clinical trial candidates are exempt under § 
271(e)(1) and also stating that incidental non-infringing activities such as 
reporting clinical trial progress to doctors, investors, analysts, journalists, and 
other non-FDA officials are not relevant to a determination of exemption under 
the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1)). 
16
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seeking FDA approval.108 
The Intermedics court also distinguished between objective 
“uses” of a patented product and subjective “purposes” behind the 
use in interpreting § 271(e)(1).109  The court needed to determine 
when a defendant’s use was “reasonably related” to seeking FDA 
approval.  The patent owner contended that the court must analyze 
the purpose of the infringer’s activities.110  But the court held that 
Congress intended an objective test for § 271(e)(1).111  The court 
then created an objective test to determine what acts are 
“reasonably related” to seeking FDA approval, and ignored the 
defendant’s subjective intent.112 
The Intermedics court found that sales of otherwise-infringing 
devices to hospitals for use in clinical trials were exempt under 
§ 271(e)(1) because the hospitals were using the devices to collect 
data for the FDA.113  The court also held that when Ventritex 
continued to sell devices to hospitals even after the application had 
already been submitted to the FDA, these sales were still exempt 
because Ventritex reasonably believed the FDA might withhold 
approval, in which case additional data from continued sales would 
be necessary.114  Thus, continued clinical trials were objectively 
 
 108. See Intermedics, Inc., 775 F. Supp. at 1277-78. 
 109. Id. at 1278. 
 110. Id.  The patentee argued that although the use by the defendant might be 
reasonably related to seeking FDA approval, the true purpose or intent behind the 
defendant’s activities was to engage in conduct “beyond generating and 
presenting data to the FDA,” and therefore the conduct infringed the patents.  Id. 
 111. Id. at 1278-80 (basing its holding on statutory language, probable 
congressional intent, the trend away from subjective tests, the difficulty of applying 
a subjective test, and the irrationality of applying a subjective test).  The court 
states it should focus on: 
[T]hose acts by Ventritex which would be deemed “infringing” but for 
§ 271(e)(1) and in which Ventritex actually has engaged (as opposed 
to the acts in which the company might engage in the future).  With 
respect to those actual acts, we do not ask what underlying motives 
might have inspired them or what indirect, ripple effects . . . they 
might bring. 
Id. at 1280. 
 112. See id. at 1278-79.  The court formulated its test by stating: “[W]e should 
ask: would it have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in defendant’s situation 
to believe that there was a decent prospect that the ‘use’ in question would 
contribute (relatively directly) to the generation of kinds of information that was 
likely to be relevant [for FDA approval].” Id. at 1280. 
 113. Id. at 1282.  The devices must be sold at cost to the persons performing 
the clinical trials.  Id. 
 114. Id. (“[E]ven after being accepted for filing, a substantial number of 
applications for pre-market approval are provisionally rejected because the FDA 
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“reasonably related” to seeking FDA approval.115 
The Intermedics decision broadened the safe harbor of § 
271(e)(1) by allowing commercial, non-infringing uses even 
though unrelated to FDA approval while also defining “solely for 
uses reasonably related” to FDA approval as an objective analysis of 
the activity rather than the subjective purpose behind the use.116  
Other courts have followed the Intermedics two-part test or inquiry 
to apply § 271(e)(1).117  The court first determines whether the 
activity at issue is an infringing one under § 271(a); and if so, 
whether the § 271(e)(1) exemption applies to that activity.118  The 
Federal Circuit adopted the Intermedics test in Telectronics Pacing 
Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.119  The Telectronics court held that 
demonstration of a medical device to physicians and non-physicians 
was necessary to obtain clinical investigators.120  It further held that 
non-infringing activities that fell outside the statutory exemption 
were irrelevant, such as using the data collected to do fundraising 
and other activities to prepare to enter the market.121 
Even the making and stockpiling of drugs by a non-patent 
owner has been found to be exempt from infringement as long as 
reasonably related to FDA approval.122  In NeoRX v. Immunomedics, 
Inc., the court held that production of large, commercial-scale 
batches of a drug by a non-patentee were exempt from 
 
concludes that [more information is needed].”  The court concludes, “it is 
reasonable to continue to generate clinical data after submitting an initial [FDA 
approval] application”).  Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1280-81. 
 117. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104, 
107 (D. Mass. 1998) (“First, § 271 applies generally only to activities that might 
constitute infringement . . . .  Second, the potentially infringing activity must be 
‘solely for uses’ related to FDA approval.”); NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc., 
877 F. Supp. 202, 206 (D. N.J. 1994). 
 118. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 107; NeoRX, Corp., 887 F. Supp. at 
206. 
 119. 982 F.2d 1520, 1525 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Amgen, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d  
at 108; Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D. Mass. 1995), aff’d, 122 
F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997); NeoRX, Corp., 877 F. Supp. at 205. 
 120. 982 F.2d at 1525. 
 121. Id.  The court added:  “To adopt [the patentee’s] interpretation we would 
have to read into [§ 271(e)(1)] an unspoken requirement that the disclosure of 
information obtained during clinical trials to persons other than FDA officials, 
although not itself an act of infringement, somehow “repeals” the exemption.  We 
do not find that requirement in the words of the statute.”  Id. at 1524. 
 122. See NeoRX, Corp., 877 F. Supp. at 206-07 (finding that other activities by 
Immunomedics were infringing and not exempt). 
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infringement regardless of the need for them because the FDA 
required proof that the manufacturer could make commercial 
quantities.123  However, in Biogen, Inc. v. Schering AG,124 Biogen’s 
excessive stockpiling was found to be in preparation of future sales 
rather than to satisfy an FDA requirement.125  Even though the FDA 
had not yet approved Biogen’s generic version, the court held that 
the stockpiling was not reasonably related to FDA approval and 
thus not exempt.126  Courts appear willing to extend § 271(e)(1) to 
the limits of seeking FDA approval but not to activities that are 
clearly infringing and wholly unnecessary for FDA approval. 
In Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,127 the court held 
that use of a patented drug as a reference standard for multiple 
experimental manufacturing processes was reasonably related to 
seeking FDA approval.128  Hoechst was seeking FDA approval on a 
first manufacturing process for erythropoietin (EPO), a drug 
patented by Amgen.129  Hoechst used EPO, made using its first 
process, as a reference standard for a second experimental 
manufacturing process for which Hoechst had not yet begun 
seeking FDA approval.130  Amgen sued Hoechst, claiming that 
Hoechst’s use of EPO as a reference standard for the second 
manufacturing process was infringement because it had not yet 
begun to seek FDA approval for that process.131  The court held that 
Hoechst’s use of the reference standard was exempt from 
infringement because Hoechst would seek FDA approval on the 
second process in the future.132  Thus, the court interpreted § 
 
 123. Id. 
 124. 954 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1996). 
 125. Id. at 396-97.  “Biogen had done far more than merely do clinical trials for 
submission to the FDA, it had spent $24 million to stockpile and prepare to 
market Avonex immediately upon the anticipated, imminent FDA approval . . . . 
These actions took Biogen out of the ‘safe harbor’. . . .”  Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998). 
 128. Id. at 109. 
 129. See id. at 108-09. 
 130. Id. at 109. 
 131. Id.  The EPO used by Hoechst was manufactured in New Hampshire by 
an independent contractor.  One batch of this EPO was sent to Japan to use as a 
reference standard where a Japanese affiliate was working on an alternative 
manufacturing process. The EPO sent to Japan would presumably be used to 
compare to the output of the new process to ensure that the new process worked 
properly.  Id. 
 132. Id.  The court further stated: 
There is no question but that an alternative manufacturing process 
would require separate FDA approval.  Moreover, the FDA guidelines 
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271(e)(1) as allowing otherwise infringing activities in anticipation 
of future requests for FDA approval. 
In general, courts interpret § 271(e)(1) broadly.  Various 
courts have held that nearly any product requiring FDA approval is 
exempt from infringement so that other manufacturers can seek 
FDA approval before the patent term expires.133  Courts also have 
decided that the infringer’s subjective intent should not be 
analyzed, but rather, if the otherwise-infringing activities can be 
objectively related to seeking FDA approval, they are exempt.134  
Furthermore, courts have broadly interpreted the term “reasonably 
related” to include many activities that will benefit the 
manufacturer once the patent term expires, such as marketing 
activities or producing commercial-sized batches of drugs, as long 
as the activities can be reasonably related back to seeking FDA 
approval.135  Non-infringing activities that have a commercial 
purpose such as fundraising, soliciting investors, and other 
activities necessary to enter the market effectively, are held to be 
irrelevant and to not affect the FDA approval safe harbor.136  Courts 
have generally relied on § 271(e)(1)’s strong public policy of 
providing cheaper generic drugs as soon as possible after the 
patent expires.137  However, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck 
KGaA138 shows that the Federal Circuit is unwilling to overextend 
either the FDA approval safe harbor provision or the experimental 
use exemption in the name of public good. 
 
contemplate the use of a reference standard sample from one 
manufacturing process to evaluate the effects of alterations in that 
process.  The Defendants’ efforts to evaluate that process were 
therefore within the class of activities protected by the statute, 
regardless of whether they had sought FDA approval at the time. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 133. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 668-69, 672 (1990). 
 134. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1278-80 (N.D. Cal. 
1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (non-precedential). 
 135. See, e.g., id. at 1278; NeoRX Corp., 877 F. Supp. at 206-07 (D. N.J. 1994). 
 136. See Intermedics, Inc., 775 F. Supp. at 1280; Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. 
Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1524-25 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 137. See, e.g., Intermedics, Inc., 775 F. Supp. at 1276-77. 
 138. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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III. INTEGRA LIFESCIENCES I, LTD. V. MERCK KGAA139 
A.  Background 
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (Integra) owns several patents 
related to the RGD peptide.140  RGD is a short segment of a protein 
having the amino acid sequence Arginine-Glycine-Aspartic Acid 
(“Arg-Gly-Asp” or “RGD”).141  The RGD peptide was found to 
promote cell adhesion to substrates, as well as blood vessel 
growth.142  In theory, the RGD peptide can be used to encourage 
wound healing as well as improve biocompatibility of prosthetic 
devices.143  The RGD peptide works by attaching to v 3 receptors on 
cell surface proteins called integrins.144 
Dr. David Cheresh, a scientist and professor at The Scripps 
Research Institute (Scripps), discovered that blocking the v 3 
receptors inhibits the formation of new blood vessels.145  Inhibiting 
new blood vessel growth appeared promising as a means of halting 
tumor growth, and was, therefore, a possible candidate for 
treatment of cancer.146  Dr. Cheresh believed that Integra’s RGD-
peptide might be useful in this respect.147  Dr. Cheresh’s work 
involved the use of cyclic RGD-containing peptides, rather than 
Integra’s linear peptides.148  Merck also realized the importance of 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 862. The patents owned by Integra relating to the RGD peptide are 
U.S. Patent Nos. 4,792,525 (the ’525 patent), 4,988,621 (the ’621 patent), 
4,789,734 (the ’734 patent), 4,879,237 (the ’237 patent), and 5,695,997 (the ’997 
patent).  Id. The RGD peptides were originally invented and patented by Integra’s 
co-plaintiff Telios Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  Id. at 873.  Telios failed to develop a 
commercially viable product and later sold its patents to Integra.  Id. 
 141. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846, 
1847 (S.D. Cal. 1999). 
 142. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 863, 873. 
 143. Id. at 863. 
 144. Id. at 862. 
 145. Id. at 863.  The process of forming new blood vessels is known 
scientifically as angiogenesis.  Id. 
 146. Id. at 863, 874.  New blood vessel formation is essential to feed the growth 
of a tumor, so stopping blood vessel formation could inhibit further tumor 
growth.  Id.  In addition to anti-tumor potential, the anti-angiogenic therapies 
could theoretically also treat diabetic retinopathy, rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, 
macular degeneration, and inflammatory bowel disease, among other medical 
maladies.  Id. 
 147. Id. at 863. 
 148. Id. at 873-74 (stating that “the cyclic peptide structure [used by Cheresh] 
solved certain problems that had been experienced with the Telios linear RGD 
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Dr. Cheresh’s work and in 1988 offered to fund further research by 
Dr. Cheresh and Scripps.149    In return for the funding, Scripps 
granted Merck an option to license any future inventions derived 
from the work.150The Merck-Scripps research effort continued 
through the late 1990s.151    In 1997, Dr. Cheresh’s research team 
chose the best new drug candidate to begin developing data for 
submission to the FDA.152 
Integra found out about the Scripps-Merck research and, 
“[b]elieving the angiogenesis research was a commercial project 
that infringed its RGD-related patents,” Integra offered Merck a 
license to use the RGD technology.153  Merck declined to take a 
license from Integra, and Integra filed a patent infringement suit 
against Merck, Scripps, and Dr. Cheresh.154 
B.  Holding 
1.  Majority Opinion 
At the trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District 
of California, the jury found that Merck infringed Integra’s patents 
and awarded Integra $15 million as a reasonable royalty.155  
Although the district court found that one of Integra’s patents, 
Patent No. 4,988,621, was invalid due to prior art,156 the jury held 
 
peptides . . . .”). 
 149. Id.; see also Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847. 
 150. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847. 
 151. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 873. 
 152. Id. at 863.  The drug candidate chosen by the Scripps research team was a 
cyclic RGD peptide identified as EMD 121974.  Id.  The researchers had three 
possible drug candidates—EMD 66203, EMD 85189, and EMD 121974—and 
performed several different in vivo and in vitro tests on each one to determine the 
“histopathology, toxicology, circulation, diffusion, and half-life of the peptides in 
the bloodstream.  These tests also examined the proper mode of administering 
the peptides for optimum therapeutic effect.”  Id. 
 153. Id.  
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 862. 
 156. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848.  Defendant Merck 
moved for summary judgment of invalidity of Claim 2 of the ’621 patent.  The 
judge found in favor of Merck on the motion and held that plaintiff’s own article, 
entitled Cell Attachment Activity of Fibronectin can be Duplicated by Small Synthetic 
Fragments of the Molecule, 309 NATURE 30, 30-33 (May 3, 1984), was prior art with 
respect to Claim 2 of Integra’s ’621 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).  Section 102 
states that the inventor “shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention 
was patented or described in a printed publication . . . more than one year prior to 
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that Integra’s four other patents were valid and infringed.157  The 
district court held that Merck’s infringing activities did not fall 
within the safe harbor provision of § 271(e)(1).158 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit in a panel consisting of Circuit 
Judges Rader, Prost, and Newman affirmed that Merck infringed 
Integra’s patents.159  In a 2-1 decision, Judges Rader and Prost held 
that neither the common-law experimental use exemption nor the 
statutory safe harbor provision of § 271(e)(1) applied to Merck’s 
activities.160  The majority held that even though Merck’s activities 
might eventually lead to a product that requires FDA approval, the 
research activities leading up to that point are not within the safe 
harbor.161  The court stated: 
[T]he Scripps work sponsored by Merck was not clinical 
testing to supply information to the FDA, but only general 
biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical 
compounds.  The FDA has no interest in the hunt for 
drugs that may or may not later undergo clinical testing 
for FDA approval.162 
The court focused on the purpose of the FDA approval safe 
harbor provision, noting that “the express objective of the 1984 
[Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration] Act was to 
facilitate the immediate entry of safe, effective generic drugs into 
the marketplace upon expiration of a pioneer drug patent.”163 
Although the language of § 271(e)(1) broadly permits 
activities “reasonably related” to FDA approval,164 the majority 
clearly refused to “expand the phrase ‘reasonably related’ to 
embrace the development of new drugs [simply] because those 
 
the date of the application for patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2003).  The Nature 
article was published one year and three weeks before the effective filing date of 
the patent application.  50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1848-49. 
 157. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 863 (finding “Merck liable for 
infringing the ’525, ’997, ’237, and ’734 patents”). 
 158. Id. at 862. 
 159. Id.  While upholding the district court’s finding of infringement, it 
remanded the reasonable royalty award because the award of $15 million was not 
supported by substantial evidence in the record.  Id. at 870-71. 
 160. Id. at 872. 
 161. Id. at 865-66. 
 162. Id. at 866. 
 163. Id. at 866-67.  The court stated “[t]he focus of the entire exemption is the 
provision of information to the FDA.  Activities that do not directly produce 
information for the FDA are already straining the relationship to the central 
purpose of the safe harbor.”  Id. at 866. 
 164. See supra Part II.B. 
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new products will also need FDA approval.”165  The court believed 
such an expansion would “exonerate infringing uses only 
potentially related to information for FDA approval” and “would 
effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning 
biotechnology tool patents.”166 
2.  Judge Newman’s Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Newman dissented in part from the majority in this case 
because she felt that the common-law experimental use exemption 
should apply to Merck’s research activities and use of the RGD 
peptide.167  The majority refused to consider the common-law 
experimental use exemption, stating that the experimental use 
exemption was not an issue presented to the jury and consequently 
could not be properly considered on appeal.168  The majority 
further stated in dictum that even if the experimental use 
exemption were before the court on appeal, the exemption 
 
 165. 331 F.3d at 867 (stating § 271(e)(1) “simply does not globally embrace all 
experimental activity that at some point, however attenuated, may lead to an FDA 
approval process”). 
 166. Id.  In stating that expanding the FDA approval would effectively 
eliminate biotechnology tool patents, the court is referring to inventions that can 
be used as research tools.  The court’s fear is that expanding the § 271(e)(1) safe 
harbor would allow drug researchers to use another’s patented research tool to 
perform experiments without recourse as long as the use of the research tool 
relates to a product requiring FDA approval.  The National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) defines research tools to be “tools that scientists use in the laboratory, 
including cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth 
factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools (such 
as PRC), methods, laboratory equipment and machines.”  Id. at 87-721 n.4 
(quoting Sharing Biomedical Research Resources: Principles and Guidelines for 
Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n.1 
(Dec. 23, 1999)). 
 167. Id. at 872 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 168. Id. at 864 n.2.  The majority opinion states in footnote 2 that: 
[T]he common law experimental use exception is not before the court 
in the instant case.  The issue before the jury was whether the 
infringing pre-clinical experiments are immunized from liability via the 
“FDA exemption,” i.e., 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1).  The district court did not 
instruct the jury on the common law [experimental use] exemption 
with respect to the Merck’s infringing activities. 
Id. 
The court’s footnote goes on to explain that on appeal, Merck did not attempt to 
argue that the experimental use exemption applies to its activities.  Counsel for 
Merck expressly stated during oral arguments that the common law experimental 
use exemption was irrelevant.  The majority chastises Judge Newman’s dissent and 
the fact that Judge Newman believes that the common law experimental use 
exemption should apply to Merck’s activities.  Id. 
24
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2004], Art. 9
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/9
SANDSTROM - FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004  11:38 PM 
2004]  EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION 1083 
probably would not apply, as the majority believed that the 
doctrine was better suited to cases of de minimis infringement and 
minimal damages.169  However, Judge Newman’s dissent noted that 
the district court did in fact apply the common law doctrine to one 
Scripps experiment conducted in 1994, but did not apply the 
exemption to any of the other experiments.170  Judge Newman 
argued that the issue was accordingly before the district court and 
could be properly considered on appeal.171 
Judge Newman believed the common-law experimental use 
exemption should apply to the type of research performed by 
Merck/Scripps for a number of reasons.172  First, the requirement 
that the patent fully discloses the invention has the very purpose of 
allowing others to study, improve upon, and reverse-engineer the 
patented invention.173  Full disclosure would serve no purpose 
whatsoever if the information cannot be used during the term of 
the patent.174 
Second, the routine and rapid appearance of improvements 
on patented subject matter, without a corresponding infringement 
suit by the patent owner, is proof that the patent system allows the 
use of the information contained in the patent to conduct research 
and develop new products.175  Judge Newman argued that the 
current rate of technological advancement is due in large part to 
the knowledge gleaned from patented inventions; if the patentee 
were allowed to prohibit such research, then the advancement of 
technology in the patentee’s field would stop.176 
Third, Judge Newman disagreed with the majority’s 
characterization of Integra’s patent as a “research tool.”177  The 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 878.  Judge Newman also noted that on appeal Merck’s counsel 
“explained at oral argument that they were not pressing this argument ‘in part 
because of a very recent case.’ ”  Id. 
 171. See id. 
 172. Id. at 875. 
 173. Id.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003). 
 174. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 875.  Judge Newman noted that the 
requirement of disclosing “details of enabling experiments and technical drawings 
and best modes and preferred embodiments . . . would be idle and purposeless if 
this information cannot be used [by others] for 17-20 years.”  Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id.  Judge Newman broadly argued that “the first patentee in the field 
could bar not only patent-protected competition, but all research that might lead 
to such competition, as well as barring improvement or challenge or avoidance of 
patented technology.”  Id. 
 177. Id. at 877-78.  See also id. at 871-72 (majority opinion). 
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majority’s argument that allowing the experimental use exemption 
to apply to the use of a research tool patent to conduct other 
research would effectively eliminate the usefulness of the patent is 
correct.178  However, Judge Newman characterized the RGD 
peptides not as research tools, but “simply new compositions 
having certain biological properties.”179 
Finally, Judge Newman believed that even if the researcher’s 
ultimate goal is to commercialize a product, the experimental use 
exemption should still apply to pre-commercialization research.180  
She reasoned that patent law barred development and 
commercialization, but not the research itself that led to 
commercialization.181  However, Judge Newman did not define the 
crossover point between research and development.182 
Even though Judge Newman did not define where research 
ends and development and commercialization begin, she 
rationalized that for a product requiring FDA approval the 
development and commercialization aspects were covered by the 
FDA approval safe harbor provision of § 271(e)(1) because the 
development and commercialization would necessarily involve 
gathering and submitting data to the FDA.183  Any period of use not 
 
 178. See id. at 867 (stating that “expansion of § 271(e)(1) to include the 
Scripps/Merck activities would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees 
owning biotechnology tool patents . . . exaggerating § 271(e)(1) would [eliminate 
all patent protection] for some categories of biotechnological inventions”). 
 179. Id. at 878. 
 180. Id. at 876 (stating that “an ultimate goal or hope of profit from successful 
research should not eliminate the exemption.  The better rule is to recognize the 
exemption for research conducted in order to understand or improve upon or 
modify the patented subject matter, whatever the ultimate goal”). 
 181. Id.  Judge Newman stated: “That is how the patent system has always 
worked: the patent is infringed by and bars activity associated with development 
and commercialization of infringing subject matter, but the research itself is not 
prohibited, nor is comparison of the patented subject matter with improved 
technology or with designs whose purpose is to avoid the patent.”  Id. 
 182. See id. at 876-77. 
 183. See id.  Judge Newman stated: 
[T]he territory that the Scripps/Merck research traversed, from 
laboratory experimentation to development of data for submission to 
the FDA, was either exempt exploratory research, or was immunized by 
§ 271(e)(1).  It would be strange to create an intervening kind of 
limbo, between exploratory research subject to exemption, and the 
FDA statutory immunity, where the patent is infringed and the activity 
can be prohibited . . . .  [T]he law does not favor such an illogical 
outcome. 
Id. at 877. 
Thus rather than defining a point where the experimental use exemption ends, 
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exempt from infringement by the research exception would be 
covered by the FDA approval safe harbor.184  Hence, the entire 
Scripps/Merck pursuit would be exempt from infringement—the 
first portions under the experimental use exemption, and the latter 
under the FDA approval safe harbor.185  However, once the FDA 
approval was gained and the safe harbor provision is no longer 
applicable, then the full force of any valid patent would be in effect 
to prevent sales of the infringing products.186 
Judge Newman further disagreed with the majority’s analysis of 
the reasonable royalty calculation.187  She believed the standard to 
be looser than the majority made it out to be, and the exact date of 
the hypothetical negotiation was not as important as the majority 
held.188 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A.  The FDA Approval Safe Harbor Provision—35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 
The Integra court correctly construed § 271(e)(1) and correctly 
applied it to Merck’s research activities.189  Merck’s research 
activities do not fall within the purpose of the statute.  The court 
could have concluded that since Merck’s research eventually would 
lead to a product requiring FDA approval, the research must be 
“reasonably related” to FDA approval.  The court properly uses the 
original purpose behind the statute to reject this overly broad 
interpretation. 
When Congress enacted § 271(e)(1) as part of the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, the intent 
was clearly to allow a generic drug manufacturer the latitude to 
 
Judge Newman stated that where the experimental use exemption ends, the FDA 
approval safe harbor begins and no further analysis is necessary.  See id. 
 184. See id. at 876-77. 
 185. See id. 
 186. See id. at 877. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.  Judge Newman’s dissent stated that “[t]he ‘hypothetical negotiation’ 
is no more than a convenience in estimating value, not a compulsory economic 
standard, and surely not one that requires appellate speculation as to when the 
parties might have hypothetically negotiated.”  Id.  Judge Newman believed that, in 
the case that Merck has been found to be an infringer, the jury’s award was “well 
supported” by “extensive” evidence on damages.  Id. 
 189. See id. at 867-68; 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000). 
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gain pre-approval on a similar generic form of a patented drug.190  
The purpose of the statute was to make generic forms of a patented 
drug available to the public as soon as a patent expired.191  Merck’s 
research activities do not fall within this purpose.  Merck was 
attempting to create an entirely new product using Integra’s 
patented RGD peptide as only a starting point, rather than gaining 
FDA approval on a generic version of Integra’s product for sale 
upon expiration of the patent.192 
Even if the Federal Circuit had applied the broad Intermedics 
test, the court still should not have held Merck’s activities to fall 
within the FDA approval safe harbor provision.  The Intermedics test 
asks, “would it have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in 
defendant’s situation to believe that there was a decent prospect 
that the ‘use’ in question would contribute (relatively directly) to 
the generation of kinds of information that was likely to be relevant 
[to FDA approval]?”193  Although this rule uses broad language 
such as “reasonable,” “decent prospect,” and “kinds of 
information . . . likely to be relevant,” Merck’s uses still fall outside 
it.  Merck’s uses cannot be said to have contributed relatively directly 
to the generation of information relevant to FDA approval.  
Merck’s activities were not meant to create data for FDA approval 
on an existing Integra product, but rather were intended to 
discover a different product worthy of submitting to the FDA.  
Merck’s activity is so far beyond the clear purpose set forth by 
Congress that interpreting its actions as falling within the safe 
harbor provision would defeat Congress’ intent. 
Even Judge Newman’s dissent in Integra admits “that ‘the 
§ 271(e)(1) safe harbor [does not] reach back down the chain of 
experimentation to embrace development and identification of 
new drugs.’ ”194  Judge Newman agreed that the initial research and 
development should not be exempted from infringement by the 
FDA approval safe harbor.195  However, Judge Newman did believe 
 
 190. See supra Part II.B. 
 191. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670 (1990).  The 
Supreme Court stated, “[s]ince [FDA approval] could not be commenced by those 
who planned to compete with the patentee until expiration of the entire patent 
term, the patentee’s de facto monopoly would continue for an often substantial 
period . . . The 1984 Act sought to eliminate this distortion . . . .”  Id. 
 192. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 862-63. 
 193. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 
1991). 
 194. See 331 F.3d at 877 (quoting the majority opinion at 865-66). 
 195. Id. 
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that once Merck had chosen a drug to submit to the FDA, then 
those activities thereafter would be exempt under the FDA 
approval safe harbor.  But more importantly, Judge Newman 
thought that Merck’s initial research should have been exempted 
under the common-law experimental use exemption, whereas the 
majority refused such a finding.196 
B.  Common-Law Experimental Use Exemption  
The Integra majority properly applied the common-law 
experimental use exemption as developed by previous case law.  
However, the experimental use exemption as it now stands is too 
narrow and should be broadened to apply to research activities 
such as Merck’s.  Thus, the majority’s decision in Integra is 
erroneous when considered from the perspective of a broader 
experimental use exemption.  Judge Newman’s dissent correctly 
broadens the experimental use exemption and applies it to Merck’s 
research. 
The majority and dissent in the Integra case are diametrically 
opposed as to the application of the common-law experimental use 
exemption.  It should be noted again that the majority did not 
analyze or apply the experimental use exemption.  They concluded 
that the trial court did not hear the issue, the jury did not decide 
the issue, and thus the issue was not ripe for appeal.197  However, 
even if they had considered the experimental use exemption issue, 
they would not have allowed it as a defense for Merck’s activities.198  
In dicta, the court stated, “the Patent Act does not include the word 
‘experimental,’ let alone an experimental use exemption from 
infringement.”199  The majority, or at least Judge Rader, believed 
the experimental use exemption is not necessary and should be 
eliminated.  Judge Rader has expressly stated so at least once 
before in his concurring opinion in Embrex, Inc. v. Service 
Engineering Corp.200  Judge Rader is correct that the Patent Act does 
not explicitly call for an experimental use exemption.  However, 
 
 196. Id. at 874-76; see supra Part II.B.; infra Part IV.B. 
 197. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 864 n.2. 
 198. See id.  
 199. Id.  The court also stated in dicta that “the judge-made [experimental 
use] doctrine is rooted in the notions of de minimis infringement better addressed 
by limited damages.”  Id. 
 200. 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring) (stating “the 
Patent Act leaves no room for any de minimis or experimental use excuses for 
infringement”). 
29
Sandstrom: How Much Do We Value Research and Development?: Broadening the Ex
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
SANDSTROM - FINAL.DOC 3/30/2004  11:38 PM 
1088 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:3 
the lack of statutory language on the subject does not inescapably 
mean that a common-law experimental use exemption serves no 
purpose or is unnecessary. 
As Judge Newman noted in her dissent, the requirement of full 
disclosure of the invention in the patent seems to presuppose the 
right of the public to use this information.  In addition, patents 
provide a monopoly that is intended to spur innovation by giving 
the patentee a reward.  The patent monopoly need only be 
extended far enough to continue to spur innovation, and need not 
monopolize the right to do research on as well as commercialize a 
patented invention. 
1.  Full Disclosure Argument in Favor of an Experimental Use 
Exemption 
a.  The Full Disclosure Rule 
A fundamental exchange of rights occurs in the patent system.  
The inventor agrees to give the public a full disclosure of the 
invention in exchange for a government-sanctioned monopoly for 
twenty years.201  As Judge Newman noted in her Integra dissent, 
“[t]he patent statute requires full disclosure of the invention, 
including details of enabling experiments and technical drawings 
and best modes and preferred embodiments, even commercial 
sources of special components.”202  The patent system also requires 
that the documents be accessible to the public.203  The Patent Act 
 
 201. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003) (requiring the patent contain a specification 
describing the patented invention in “full, clear, concise, and exact terms”); 35 
U.S.C. § 154 (2003) (granting patent rights for twenty years from the filing date of 
the patent application). 
 202. 331 F.3d at 875.  See also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003).  Section 112 states that 
the patent specification must include: 
[A] written description of the invention, and of the manner and 
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the 
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor 
of carrying out his invention. 
Id. 
 203. See United States Patent and Trademark Office Editorial Standards, 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/main/ccpubguide.htm (last visited March 24, 
2004).  The USPTO web site states: 
Patents are published into the public domain as part of the terms of 
granting the patent to the inventor. As such, they are not subject to 
copyright restrictions. The inventors’ right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention . . . is not 
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even allows for patent applications to become publicly available 
eighteen months after the filing date, consequently facilitating full 
public disclosure of the invention, even before a patent has 
issued.204  The patent application and patent itself must contain a 
description of the patented invention, as well as how to make and 
use it, in “full, clear, concise and exact” details such that “any 
person skilled in the art” could make and use it.205  The patent must 
also include what the inventor considers to be the “best mode” of 
the invention.206  Thus, the patentee gives up the right to secrecy 
and makes a full disclosure of the invention to the public in order 
to gain the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling 
the invention.207 
Judge Newman believed that prohibiting all research on 
patented subject matter is both “impractical” and “incorrect” as 
patents are a major source of scientific knowledge.208  While 
discussing the full disclosure rule, Judge Newman stated, “such 
details would be idle and purposeless if this information cannot be 
used for 17-20 years.”209  This argument makes sense.  What 
 
compromised by the publication of the description of the invention.  
In other words, the fact that a patent’s description is in the public 
domain does not give you permission to manufacture or use the 
invention without permission from the inventor during the active life 
of the patent. 
Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2) (2003) (stating that the USPTO “shall be 
responsible for disseminating to the public information with respect to patents 
and trademarks”).  See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10, 12 (2003) (allowing for different 
methods of making patents available to the public). 
 204. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2003) (stating that, with a few exceptions 
under § 122(b)(2), “each application for a patent shall be published . . . promptly 
after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date . . . .”  
The exceptions include when the application is: 1) no longer pending; 2) subject 
to a secrecy order under § 181; 3) a provisional application filed under § 111(b); 
4) an application for a design patent; or 5) the invention has not and will not be 
the subject of a patent application in a foreign country and the applicant requests 
that the application not be published). 
 205. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003). 
 206. Id. 
 207. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 45, 52 (D. Mass. 
1995) (“From the early days of the republic, our patent law has required that in 
exchange for a government-sanctioned monopoly on the rights to an invention or 
discovery, the inventor must teach the world the secret behind the method or 
device”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003) (stating “whoever without authority 
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent” 
thus giving the patent holder the right to sue the infringers for damages, an 
injunction, or both). 
 208. 331 F.3d at 875. 
 209. Id. 
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purpose does the full disclosure rule have if the public cannot 
build and improve upon this knowledge?  If the patent system does 
not want the public to utilize the information until after the patent 
expires, then patents should not be published and made available, 
but instead be kept secret until expiration.210  If the patentee is to 
have complete supremacy over the information in the patent, then 
it would be much easier for the patentee to secure and enforce 
those rights if the patent is not disclosed to the public.  The 
patentee could more easily exclude others from making, using, 
selling, and researching the patented subject matter if the patent was 
not publicly disclosed.211 
One could argue that a broader experimental use exemption 
would encourage an inventor to make an incomplete disclosure of 
the invention in the patent, revealing as little as possible to prevent 
researchers from effectively using the disclosure.212  However, an 
incomplete disclosure would violate 35 U.S.C. § 112, which 
requires, 1) a full description of the invention, 2) enablement, and 
3) the best mode.213  An inadequate disclosure will cause either the 
patent examiner to reject the patent application214 or cause a court 
to invalidate the patent.215  In addition, other practitioners in the 
 
 210. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in 
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 219 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Proprietary 
Rights]. 
  If the public had absolutely no right to make, use, or sell the 
patented invention until the end of the patent term, it would be 
somewhat puzzling to require that the patentee give the public an 
enabling disclosure of the invention at the beginning of the patent 
term. The requirement of early disclosure suggests that certain uses 
of patented inventions during the patent term do not constitute 
patent infringement. 
Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Some argue that this incomplete disclosure problem already occurs.  See 
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533-34 (1966); Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, 
at 1029. 
 213. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003). 
 214. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01 (2003); 37 C.F.R. § 
1.71(a) (2003). 
 215. See, e.g., Beidler v. United States, 253 U.S. 447, 453 (1920) (stating that “it 
has been consistently held that a correct and adequate description or disclosure of 
a claimed discovery . . . is essential to the validity of a patent, for the reason that such a 
disclosure is necessary in order to give the public the benefit of the invention after 
the patent shall expire”) (emphasis added); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 
108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (invalidating the plaintiff’s patent for lack of an 
enabling disclosure). 
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field can examine the disclosure and decide if it is enabling.216  If it 
is not, then the practitioner can infringe the patent with the 
knowledge that lack of enablement is a sufficient defense to 
invalidate the patent.217  Therefore, this incomplete disclosure 
problem should not dissuade the use of a broader experimental 
use exemption. 
b.  Allowed Uses of the Patent Disclosure 
The patent system already seems to acquiesce to the public’s 
use of patented information.  Improvements on patented subject 
matter appear quickly and routinely regardless of whether the 
patentee has licensed the technology to others.218  It is highly 
unlikely that all of these improvements come by way of 
independent research.  Rather, ambitious inventors or researchers 
likely study the current state of the art including issued patents and 
then improve upon the art.  The appearance of improvements to 
patented subject matter tends to prove that the public already uses 
the patent disclosure to conduct some amount of research and 
development. 
c.  Designing Around a Patented Invention 
As further proof that the patent system allows the public to use 
the information in the patent, the Federal Circuit has stated on 
many occasions that the public is not only able, but encouraged, to 
“design around” a patented invention.219  Designing around a 
 
 216. See Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights, supra note 210, at 219. 
 217. Id.  Eisenberg states that practitioners in the field may be more able to 
discern defect in the patent specification than the patent examiner.  Id.  “Since an 
insufficient disclosure makes the patent invalid and unenforceable, those who 
have a use for the patented technology will be motivated to uncover defects in the 
specification in order to avoid liability to the patentee.”  Id. 
 218. See generally Beidler, 253 U.S. at 453. 
 219. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36 
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that “keeping track of a competitor’s products and 
designing new and possibly better or cheaper functional equivalents is the stuff of 
which competition is made and is supposed to benefit the consumer.  One of the 
benefits of a patent system is its so-called ‘negative incentive’ to ‘design around’ a 
competitor’s products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of 
innovations to the marketplace”); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 
1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating “designing or inventing around patents to 
make new inventions is encouraged” when the party designs around by making a 
“substantial change” to the invention.  However, “piracy” by making an 
“insubstantial change” is not allowed”); Westvaco Corp. v. Int’l Paper Co., 991 F.2d 
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patented invention entails making changes to the invention so that 
the new design no longer fits within the scope of the patent’s 
claims.220  The new design may be very similar to the patented 
invention and directly compete in the same marketplace against 
the invention; but because the new design does not contain all the 
elements of the patent claim, it is not an infringing product.221  The 
Federal Circuit has stated that designing around a patented 
invention is encouraged because it promotes free competition, 
which benefits the public.222  The full disclosure rule effectively 
enables competitors to more easily design around a patented 
invention. 
However, in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp.,223 the 
Federal Circuit did not allow Service Engineering to infringe 
Embrex’s patent while attempting to design around it.224  Service 
Engineering built several machines that were held to still infringe 
the patents.225  The Federal Circuit rejected Service Engineering’s 
argument that the machines were for experimental use only to 
design around the patent.226  Even though Service Engineering 
never sold any of the machines built, the court held that the use 
had a commercial purpose and was not an exempt experimental 
use.227  Apparently, the Federal Circuit encourages designing 
around the patent only when an infringing design is not made.  
Service Engineering was unsuccessful in building a non-infringing 
device.228  One wonders if Service Engineering would have been 
 
735, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting both State Industries and London with approval); 
Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(holding “[i]ntentional ‘designing around’ the claims of a patent is not by itself a 
wrong which must be compensated . . . . Designing around patents is, in fact, one 
of the ways in which the patent system works to the advantage of the public in 
promoting progress in the useful arts . . . . ”). 
 220. See Slimfold Mfg., Co., 932 F.2d at 1457. 
 221. See id. The subtle test of whether the design around has been effective in 
avoiding the patent claims involves applying what is known as the “doctrine of 
equivalents” to determine whether a “substantial change” has been made to the 
product by the alleged infringer.  Id. 
 222. See State Indus., Inc., 751 F.2d at 1235 (“designing around a patented 
invention creates “new and possibly better or cheaper functional equivalents . . . 
and is supposed to benefit the consumer”); Westvaco Corp., 991 F.2d at 745 (same).  
See also Slimfold Mfg., Inc., 932 F.2d at 1457. 
 223. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 224. Id. at 1346-47, 1349. 
 225. Id. at 1349. 
 226. See id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 1346-47. 
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liable for infringement if it had successfully designed around the 
patent claims. 
A patent system that encourages designing around a patented 
invention to promote competition seems to contradict a system that 
will not allow a competitor to use the patent disclosure to conduct 
independent research on a completely different derivative product.  
During the process of designing around a patented product, the 
competitor is likely to: 1) build the patented invention the 
competitor wants to design around as a first step,229 and 2) build 
multiple attempts to design around the patent that would still 
infringe.  The process of designing around a patent seems to 
encourage infringement as long as the end product does not 
directly infringe.230  Using the patent disclosure to design around a 
patented invention is similar to conducting research based on the 
patent disclosure.  The usual process of designing around a patent 
likely involves a great deal of research.  The competitor conducting 
independent research based on a patent and the competitor 
designing around a patent both have the ultimate goal of 
producing a differentiable product that is based on the patented 
invention.  Yet, the courts seem to encourage designing around 
while penalizing commercial research.  Designing around the 
patented subject matter is clearly a “commercial purpose.”  
Consequently, exploratory research using the patented subject 
matter should not be deemed infringement simply because the 
research might be linked to a future commercial purpose to the 
researcher. 
One major difference between designing around and 
exploratory research is that in designing around, the ultimate goal 
is to produce a product that does not infringe, whereas research 
does not necessarily lead to a non-infringing product.  For 
example, Merck created a different and more useful product than 
Integra,231 but the final product created by Merck still contained 
 
 229. This argument assumes that the patented invention is not available on the 
market.  If the patented invention is available on the market, the competitor 
might simply purchase the product from the patentee as a first step, study the 
purchased product, and then attempt to design around it. 
 230. But see Embrex, Inc., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (not allowing the 
infringing defendant to use the experimental use exemption as a defense to 
patent infringement when the defendant made and used the plaintiff’s patented 
machine for experiments in an attempt to design around the patent). 
 231. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 863 (noting Merck’s research 
created a new cyclic RGD peptide product potentially effective and safe enough to 
warrant clinical human testing). 
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the limitations of Integra’s claims (the peptide sequence RGD) and 
therefore still infringed Integra’s patent.232  The patentee may 
claim an invention comprising the elements A-B-C, where the 
researcher’s final product may contain the narrower group of 
components A-B-C-D.  The researcher’s final product is indeed 
different, but it still contains all the elements (A-B-C) of the 
patented invention.  Consequently, the researcher could not 
commercialize his product without infringing the patent.233  
However, as discussed more in depth later, this does not necessarily 
mean that the researcher should be barred from conducting his 
research on the patented invention in the first place. 
The full disclosure rule, the encouragement of designing 
around a patented invention, and the rapid appearance of 
independent improvements to patented inventions all point to the 
conclusion that the patent system tolerates the public’s use of the 
patent disclosure to improve upon the patented subject matter.  
Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions, including Integra 
v. Merck, construed the experimental use exemption too narrowly 
based on the existence of potential commercial purpose. 
The full disclosure rule effectively supports free use of 
patented subject matter for research.  But on a more fundamental 
level, the patent system should allow free use of patented subject 
matter for research purposes.  The ultimate purpose of the patent 
system is to create an incentive to invent.  Based on that incentive, 
the patent monopoly should not be construed to exclude research 
activities. 
2.  The Patent Monopoly and Incentive to Invent Arguments 
a.  Purpose and Theory Behind Patent Law 
The Constitution of the United States authorized a patent 
system in order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
 
 232. See id. at 868-69 (rejecting Merck’s argument that its product was non-
infringing due to the cyclic structure of Merck’s RGD peptide). 
   233.  For comparison’s sake, the party designing around the patented invention 
would attempt to create a product such as A-B-E.  Although A-B-E will be very 
similar to patentee’s A-B-C and may directly compete with it, since A-B-E does not 
contain all of the elements of the patented invention, it is not infringing and can 
be commercialized. 
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exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”234  A 
patent gives its holder the right to exclude others from making, 
using, or selling235 the patented invention for a term of twenty 
years.236 
A patent is an anomaly in our economic system.237  The United 
States economy favors capitalism and free competition over all 
other ideals.  Our wide body of antitrust law238 provides ample 
evidence that our government favors free trade.239  One of the 
greatest impediments to free competition is a government-
sanctioned monopoly, such as a patent.  In addition, patents are 
contrary to the general scientific principle that discoveries should 
be disclosed for the benefit of all.240  Scientists are generally 
inclined to share their discoveries with fellow scientists, at least in 
the academic fields, to allow all to benefit from their discoveries.241  
Full disclosure allows other scientists to validate the findings and 
also prevents duplicative research.  Thus a patent that allows the 
inventor to preclude the public from using the invention for 
research is counter to the traditional scientific norms as well as the 
 
 234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  This clause of the Constitution also allows for 
copyrights to authors.  See id. 
 235. See 35 U.S.C §§ 154(a)(1), 271(a) (2003) (granting the patentee “the 
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the 
invention . . . .”). 
 236. See 35 U.S.C § 154(a)(2) (2003) (allowing twenty-year patent term from 
the date of filing the patent application). 
 237. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966) (noting that 
Thomas Jefferson, when acting as a founder of the patent system, had aversions to 
the patent monopoly and monopolies in general and wanted the patent to be only 
as strong as necessary to promote invention). 
 238. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 92 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “antitrust law” as 
“[t]he body of law designed to protect trade and commerce from restraints, 
monopolies, price-fixing, and price discrimination”).  The federal antitrust laws 
are generally set forth in the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7) and the Clayton Act 
(15 U.S.C.  §§ 12-27).  Id. 
 239. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, § 5, at 20 
(1977) (noting that “[a]s legislative history and case law both disclose, the general 
objective of the antitrust laws is the maintenance of competition.  Competition per 
se thus becomes a goal of the legal order”). 
 240. See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1046-47.  Enforcing patent rights 
against researchers “fundamentally conflicts with traditional scientific norms 
calling for free dedication of new knowledge to the scientific community.”  Id. at 
1046.  The tradition among scientists, at the very least in the non-commercial 
sector, has always been to publish their results for the benefit of all.  Id. at 1046-47.  
Allowing others to use a new discovery to their advantage prevents duplicative 
research, which wastes time, wastes resources, and benefits no one.  Id. at 1028-47. 
 241. See id. at 1046-47. 
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capitalist ideal of free competition. 
Multiple theories explain the purpose of awarding patents.  
Main theories include: 1) the patent system gives an inventor his 
natural right to be the only one to profit from his creation;242 2) the 
patent system encourages public disclosure of inventions that 
might otherwise be used as a trade secret and not publicly 
disclosed;243 and 3) the patent system spurs innovation and gives 
people an incentive to invent.244 
The natural rights theory, that an inventor deserves a 
monopoly as his natural right for inventing, was expressly rejected 
by the Supreme Court in the case of Graham v. John Deere Co.245  The 
Court supported Thomas Jefferson’s view that the patent is based 
on social and economic rationales, intended to be a reward to 
induce people to “bring forth new knowledge.”246  The Court noted 
the “high level of patentability” and the strict requirements that 
must be met before obtaining a patent (novelty, utility, and non-
obviousness).247  Another argument in support of the Court’s 
 
 242. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 9 (discussing how the patent was not created to 
represent an inventor’s natural right to his/her invention). 
 243. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) (Marshall, 
J., concurring) (finding “the existence of trade secret protection provides in some 
instances a substantial disincentive to entrance into the patent system, and thus 
deprives society of the benefits of public disclosure of the invention which it is the 
policy of the patent laws to encourage”); Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota 
Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 138 n.2 (9th Cir. 1965) (“The federal patent 
statutes require full disclosure of the invention as a condition to the grant of 
monopoly . . . . Thus, the federal patent statutes would seem to reflect a 
congressional determination that any individual or social interests which may be 
served by secrecy [or a trade secret law] are outweighed by those served by full 
disclosure.”). 
 244. See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1024-30.  Eisenberg notes two 
main theories behind the patent’s purpose: the incentive to invent and the 
incentive to disclose.  Id.  She also notes a more abstract theory that the patent 
provides an “incentive to innovate” that is distinct from an incentive to invent.  Id. 
at 1036-38. 
 245. 383 U.S. at 9 (noting commentary from the 1800s on the subject by 
Thomas Jefferson and stating that “[t]he patent monopoly was not designed to 
secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries.  Rather it was a reward, 
an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”). 
 246. See id. (supporting Thomas Jefferson’s belief that the patent “was the 
creation of society—at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas—and 
was not to be freely given.”).  Regarding Thomas Jefferson, the Court states, 
“[b]ecause of his active interest and influence in the early development of the 
patent system, Jefferson’s views on the general nature of the limited patent 
monopoly under the Constitution, as well as his conclusions as to conditions for 
patentability under the statutory scheme, are worthy of note.”  Id. at 7. 
 247. See id. at 8-9. See also CHISUM, supra note 1, at chs. 1-5 (detailing the 
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reasoning in Graham is that if the patent were a natural right of the 
inventor, it should last forever rather than expiring after twenty 
years.  In general, a natural right should not expire after a set 
period of time. 
The other two theories, incentive to publicly disclose and 
incentive to invent, are the reasons most commonly advanced as 
the purpose of the patent system.248  The incentive-to-disclose 
argument has been favored by courts but has had less support from 
economists.249  In most cases, if patents did not exist, the public 
eventually would be able to gain disclosure of the invention by 
buying the product and reverse engineering it.250  Although reverse 
engineering probably is more difficult than reading the disclosure 
of a patent, this reason alone is not enough to justify the patent 
system.  For the few inventions that cannot be reverse engineered 
and can be effectively used as a trade secret, it does not make sense 
for the inventor to seek a patent.  A patent requires disclosure and 
the protection lasts for only twenty years, but a trade secret 
theoretically could be exploited perpetually as a monopoly.251  The 
full disclosure rule alone is not an effective argument to justify 
patents. 
The best argument in favor of a patent system is that the 
patent provides a reward that induces creative minds to invent.252  
In Graham, the Supreme Court stated that the patent monopoly was 
designed to be “a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new 
knowledge.”253  Without the reward of the patent monopoly, an 
inventor’s invention would be too easy for competitors to 
misappropriate and sell without the expense and effort of having to 
invent.254  Inventing may be expensive, as it consumes time, 
manpower, and large amounts of money.  Copying, on the other 
hand, is always cheaper.  Without patent protection, inventors 
 
patentability criteria of eligible subject matter (ch. 1), originality (ch. 2), novelty 
(ch.3), utility (ch. 4), and nonobviousness (ch. 5)).  Logically, a patent should not 
require passing so many hurdles if it were a natural, inherent right. 
 248. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 480-81 (noting that patents provide an 
incentive or reward to inventors to encourage inventing, as well as a method to 
ensure public disclosure of the invention for the benefit of the public’s use once 
the patent expires); Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1024-29. 
 249. See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1028-29. 
 250. Id. at 1029. 
 251. Id. 
 252. See id. at 1024-26; Graham, 383 U.S. at 9. 
 253. 383 U.S. at 9. 
 254. Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1024-28. 
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would be less likely to invent for fear of their ideas being stolen and 
potential financial rewards being obtained by competitors.  If the 
inventor must face free competition, the market price of the 
invention may be driven down to the point where the inventor can 
no longer recoup the initial investment cost of creating the 
invention, which the free-loading competitors do not have to pay.255  
The patent monopoly allows the inventor to stop infringers, 
increases profitability of the invention, and creates a stronger 
incentive to invent. 
b.  Application of the Incentive-to-Invent Theory 
Because the incentive-to-invent argument seems to be the 
strongest underlying purpose of the patent system, the 
experimental use exemption should be analyzed in view of the 
incentive to invent.  Would there still be an adequate incentive to 
invent and obtain patents if the experimental use exemption were 
broadened, allowing researchers to freely use inventions for 
research purposes?  A broader experimental use exemption would 
promote free use of ideas, would encourage competitors to study 
and improve upon patented subject matter, and arguably would 
spur more innovation.  However, a broader experimental use 
exemption also weakens the patent monopoly, possibly decreasing 
the incentive to invent in the first place.256  A balance must be 
struck between the two competing objectives. 
The current judicial trend appears to be to weaken, if not 
eliminate, the experimental use exemption.257  The Integra decision 
leans toward the view that the power to exclude and monopolize 
should be all-encompassing.258  Judge Rader stated in dicta that the 
patent statute did not allow for an experimental use doctrine, and 
that the judge-made experimental use doctrine was better 
addressed by limited damages to the patentee when infringement 
was de minimis, rather than an outright exemption from 
infringement.259  Similarly, in Madey v. Duke University,260 the Federal 
 
 255. Id. at 1025. 
 256. See Karp, supra note 17, at 2169 (arguing that a broad experimental use 
exemption would decrease the incentive to innovate, would not result in a 
corresponding increase in research, and would, therefore, lead to a decline in the 
rate of invention). 
 257. See supra Part II.B. 
 258. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
 259. Id. at  864 n.2. 
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Circuit held that if the researcher’s use of the patented subject 
matter could be linked to the slightest commercial purpose or 
legitimate business interest, then the experimental use exemption 
should not apply.261  These Federal Circuit decisions eliminate any 
useful facet of an experimental use exemption. 
Congress has considered enacting a statutory experimental use 
exemption but has failed to do so.262  A 1988 bill on patenting 
transgenic animals originally included an experimental use 
exemption, but the exemption was later removed from the bill.263  
Upon removing the exemption, the House Report suggested 
instead that sometime in the future, Congress should enact an 
experimental use exemption that applied to all inventions.264  
Shortly thereafter, the Patent Competitiveness and Technological 
Act of 1990 proposed a broad experimental use exemption 
supported by the House Judiciary Committee but not enacted by 
Congress.265  The Plant Variety Protection Act contains a fairly 
broad experimental use exemption, but it is limited to plant 
patents.266  Clearly, Congress has contemplated an experimental use 
exemption for patents but has failed, as of yet, to enact one. 
Judge Newman’s dissent in Integra favored a broader 
experimental use exemption—specifically, an exemption that 
would protect research activities, such as Merck’s, that have a 
commercial undertone.267  Judge Newman framed her argument on 
the full disclosure aspect of patent law, as well as the generalization 
that research and improvement on patented subject matter 
historically have always been allowed.268  This note illustrates that 
the argument in favor of a broad experimental use exemption can 
 
 260. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 261. See id. at 1362. 
 262. See Johnson, supra note 17, at 528-29. 
 263. Id. at 528. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 529.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-960, pt. I (1990). 
 266. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2003).  See also Peter J. Goss, Comment, Guiding the Hand 
That Feeds: Toward Socially Optimal Appropriability in Agricultural Biotechnology 
Innovation, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1408-10 (1996) (noting that the experimental use 
exemption was narrowed by Congress in 1994).  “Congress attempted to limit the 
potential for abuse of the experimental use exemption by declaring that varieties 
‘essentially derived’ from protected varieties are infringing . . . .”  Id. at 1410 
(quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2541(c)(1) (1994)). 
 267. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 876 (Newman, J., dissenting).  
Judge Newman stated that “an ultimate goal or hope of profit from successful 
research should not eliminate the [experimental use] exemption.”  Id. 
 268. See id. at 876-77. 
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also be made on the basis of the incentive to invent. 
A patent system with a broader experimental use exemption 
would continue to spur innovation by providing patentees with 
adequate protections from infringement.  An inventor would still 
have the sole right to commercialize the invention.  If the invention 
is a product, then the inventor would still have the sole right to sell 
the invention.  If the invention is a process, then the inventor 
would still have the sole right to sell products made with the 
patented process.  A patentee’s commercialization should be the 
main source of revenue for a majority of inventions, rather than 
licenses to competitors conducting research.  The patentee would 
still be able to gain back any money invested into creating the 
patented invention and also make a profit through commercial 
sales.  This would be true regardless of whether the competitive 
researcher’s purpose is purely “philosophical” or if the research is 
conducted with an eye toward future profits.  Either way, a patent 
that allows others to research but not commercialize would provide 
the patentee with ample incentive to invent. 
c.  Harmonizing the United States with Foreign Patent Practices 
Some commentators argue that weakening the patent 
monopoly will decrease the incentive to invent, leading to a 
decrease in the rate of invention.269  Compared to other countries, 
the United States has always had strong patent protection and has 
been, and is currently, one of the highest ranked producers of 
technological innovation.270  But it does not necessarily follow that a 
broader experimental use exemption will decrease the rate of 
innovation.  Countries including Japan, Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, and the United Kingdom, 
have high “innovative capacity.”271  Many top innovators, such as 
 
 269. See Karp, supra note 17, at 2187-88 (arguing “[a]ny weakening of the 
patent monopoly will discourage inventors from utilizing patent protection” and 
proposing instead to use compulsory licensing from patentees to researchers for a 
“reasonable royalty” that is paid only when the research “resulted in a benefit to 
the experimenter”). 
 270. See Michael E. Porter & Scott Stern, The New Challenge to America’s 
Prosperity: Findings from the Innovation Index 34 (1999), available at 
http://www.compete.org/pdf/innovation.pdf (last visited March 24, 2004).  A 
Washington, D.C., think tank known as the Council on Competitiveness 
conducted a study comparing the “innovative capacity” of the United States and 
other countries.  Id.  The study consistently ranked the United States as one of the 
top innovators in the world.  Id. 
 271. Id. 
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Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Korea, and 
Canada, have broad experimental use exemptions in their patent 
law.272  Yet, these countries continue to create many innovative 
products, and their citizens continue to seek patent protection 
from their respective patent systems.273  It cannot be said that a 
broad experimental use exemption necessarily will lead to a 
decrease in innovation. 
The broad experimental use exemptions in other countries 
may place American inventors and researchers at a disadvantage.  
Today, many inventors seek patent protection in their own country 
as well as in other countries.274  Consider when a Japanese company 
receives a patent both in Japan and the United States.  Other 
competitive researchers in Japan would be able to freely conduct 
research on the patentee’s invention due to Japan’s broad 
experimental use exemption.  But in the United States, the 
Japanese patentee can prevent American researchers from 
commercially researching the patented subject matter under the 
current law.275  This problem occurs with respect to every country 
that has a broad experimental use exemption.  Competitive 
researchers in foreign countries can and will receive patents on 
derivative subject matter, whereas the American competitive 
researchers do not even have a chance to conduct research on the 
foreign inventor’s patented invention.  A correspondingly broad 
experimental use doctrine in the United States would eliminate 
 
 272. See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 685, 718-19 (2002); Mueller, supra note 15, at 37-40; Eisenberg, Patents, 
supra note 17, at 1018 n.6; Johnson, supra note 17, at 527. 
 273. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical 
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2148 (2000). In the United 
States patent system, only about fifty-five percent of patents are from American 
inventors.  Id.  Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Korea, and 
Canada were all in the top ten foreign countries for most patents filed in the 
United States.  Id.  The author makes the assumption that the vast majority of 
inventors seek protection in their own countries, as well as seeking U.S. patent 
protection. 
 274. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001—WORKLOAD TABLES 112-16 (2002), 
available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2001/01accompinfo.pdf (last 
visited March 24, 2004) [hereinafter USPTO Performance and Accountability].  Of 
the 344,717 patent applications filed in the United States in 2001, forty-five 
percent were filed by residents of foreign countries.  Id.  Of the 187,822 patents 
issued in 2001 by the USPTO, forty-six percent went to residents of foreign 
countries.  Id. 
 275. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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this problem. 
d.  Lost Profits and Patented Inventions That Are Only Useful 
for Research 
A broader experimental use exemption might create 
unfairness to the patentee if the invention is not commercially 
successful but still has research potential.  This was the unfortunate 
case for Integra.  Integra knew its patented RGD peptide was 
useful, but could not seem to produce a product that was 
commercially viable.276  Dr. Cheresh saw potential value in the 
invention, and Merck funded his further study of the RGD 
peptides.277  In such a case, Integra’s only revenue from the patents 
would be from licenses to outside researchers, such as Dr. Cheresh 
and Merck.  To prove that such revenue can be substantial, one 
only needs to consider the $15 million jury award of reasonable 
royalties to Integra.278 
On the other hand, forcing researchers to seek licenses will 
hamper further research.  Researchers may not have millions of 
dollars to pay royalties and would be especially reluctant to pay 
royalties unless research will surely lead to a valuable product.  In 
more extreme cases, a patentee may refuse to grant a license if the 
patentee views a researcher as a hungry competitor out to design a 
competing product based on the patented invention, rather than a 
customer willing to pay royalties for it.279  A broader experimental 
use exemption would eliminate these restraints on research; but 
eliminating royalties to patentees also reduces the patentee’s 
profits. 
 
 276. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 873.  The RGD peptide was 
actually discovered and patented by co-plaintiff Telios Pharmaceuticals in the mid- 
to late 1980s.  Telios was unable to develop a commercially viable product and sold 
all of its patent rights to Integra in December of 1996.  Id. 
 277. Id. at 863. 
 278. See id. at 862.  Although the Federal Circuit reversed the jury’s award of 
$15 million for lack of substantial evidence, the figure gives a rough estimate of 
what research licenses can be worth.  Id. 
 279. See Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights, supra note 210, at 224.  The author 
postulates: 
The patent holder . . . has an interest in prolonging the period in 
which the public is dependent on the patented technology. If the 
patentee sees the research user as a competitor rather than a customer, 
she may refuse to license the invention. Without an experimental use 
defense, it is possible that no one would be able to build on the 
inventor’s discovery until the patent expired. 
Id. 
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However, the patent system is not in place to guarantee 
maximum profits to the inventor, but instead to promote 
invention.  The royalties from other researchers might add to an 
inventor’s wealth, but the loss of such financial benefits can hardly 
take away all of scientists’ incentive to invent.280  Very few inventors 
set out to invent a product that appeals only to other researchers.  
A majority of scientific research is aimed to create a product that 
will achieve eventual commercial success in the general consumer 
market.  Therefore, scientists arguably would continue to innovate 
even if a broader experimental use exemption might eliminate 
potential royalties from other researchers. 
On the other hand, a patentee could lose revenue from a 
broader experimental use exemption due to: 1) lost royalties from 
researcher licenses; 2) lost revenue when the outside researcher 
successfully designs around a patented invention and creates a 
directly competitive product; and 3) lost revenue when other 
researchers create a separately patentable derivative product that 
the patentee could have otherwise invented but failed to.  However, 
none of these harms to the patentee should deter the 
implementation of a broader experimental use exemption. 
First, very few inventions gain major revenue from license 
royalties.281  Most revenue from a patent should come from the sale 
of products to consumers rather than research royalties.  If most of 
the revenue comes from research royalties, should a patent on the 
invention be awarded at all?  Such an invention does not benefit 
the public in a direct sense, since the public is not buying the 
product.  The only public benefit occurs if a subsequent 
researcher, paying royalties, creates a publicly useful product.  
Perhaps the subsequent inventor of the derivative, public-
benefiting product should be the only person rewarded with a 
patent.  The patent system should encourage inventions with public 
 
 280. Most patented inventions never attain wide commercial success, and 
receiving a patent does not guarantee success in the marketplace.  See Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property Law?, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 103, 106 (1999) 
(“Most inventions receive no royalties; about ten percent earn significant returns, 
and a very few have huge payoffs”).  Furthermore, a large number of inventions do 
not even receive patents due to a failure to meet the strict statutory requirements 
of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness.  For example, from 1997 to 2001, the 
Patent Office granted patents to only seventy to seventy-two percent of the patent 
applications processed to completion during the year.  See USPTO Performance and 
Accountability, supra note 274, at 106.  Yet the patent system continues to stimulate 
the search for new products and processes in the hopes for commercial success. 
 281. See Easterbrook, supra note 280, at 106. 
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benefit more than inventions that require further research to be of 
public use.  A broader experimental use exemption promotes 
creating publicly desired inventions because a patentee could 
derive profits only from public sales rather than licenses to other 
researchers.  The one exception to this rule is for inventions 
termed “research tools,” which are described in more detail 
below.282 
Second, a patentee loses revenue from competitive researchers 
who create a directly competing product.  This should not stop a 
broader experimental use exemption.  Patentees lose the most 
revenue when a competing product is invented that creates a better 
and/or cheaper solution to the same problem.283  As discussed 
earlier, this is known as “designing around” a patent.284  Allowing 
researchers to design around a patent clearly decreases the 
patentee’s incentive to invent.  But, as noted above, the patent 
system already encourages designing around a patent because the 
American economy derives benefit from free competition.285  
Patentees already face the possibility that a competitor will design 
around the patent.  A broader experimental use exemption would 
only make designing around a patent less risky, as researchers 
would not have to worry about infringement charges.286  A broader 
experimental use exemption would further promote an already 
existing ideal. 
Third, the fact that a competitor might create a separably 
patentable derivative invention will only spur more innovation.  
The risk of competition would lead a patentee to create and patent 
any derivative products even more quickly to avoid the potential 
loss of derivative patents to competitors.  A broader experimental 
use exemption would bring about a more rapid development of 
improvements on patented subject matter and also derivative 
 
 282. See infra Part IV.B.2.e. 
 283. See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1035-36 (noting that when a 
researcher aims to develop a competing product, a broader experimental use 
exemption lowers the patentee’s profits, and thus also the incentive to invent, in 
two ways: first, by denying the patentee of royalties that would have otherwise been 
paid; and second, by threatening to “cut short the effective duration of the patent 
holder’s monopoly if the user succeeds in developing a competing technology”). 
 284. See infra Part IV.B.1.c. 
 285. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text. 
 286. See Embrex Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000) 
(awarding patentee infringement damages against a competitor who made and 
used the patented invention for research in an attempt to design around the 
patent). 
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products.  In this sense, revenue loss to the patentee due to a 
broader experimental use exemption is justified. 
e.  Special Rules for Research Tools 
Products intended from the start to be valuable only to other 
researchers are usually termed as “research tools.”  A research tool 
is “a product or method whose purpose is use in the conduct[ing] 
of research . . . .”287  One simple example of a research tool would 
be a chemist’s test tube.  The inventor of a patented test tube 
intends to sell it, for the most part, to other researchers.  The test 
tube itself is not being researched, but functions as a tool to 
conduct research.  The majority and dissent in Integra disagreed 
about whether Integra’s RGD peptide was a research tool.  The 
majority held that the RGD peptides were a research tool, but the 
dissent called them “simply new compositions having certain 
biological properties.”288  However, both the majority and dissent 
seem to agree that the experimental use exemption should not 
apply to unrelated research conducted using a patented “research 
tool.”289 
Using the test tube example, if a chemist copies a patented test 
tube and uses it to perform other experiments, then neither the 
majority nor dissent in Integra would allow the chemist to claim an 
experimental use exemption if the test tube patentee sues.  
However, Judge Newman realized and noted that if a researcher 
was studying and trying to improve upon the research tool itself, 
then the experimental use exemption (if broadened) should 
apply.290  But, as a matter of common sense, if the value of an 
invention is to serve as a research tool, the use of such an invention 
to conduct other research cannot be exempted from infringement 
under the experimental use exemption.  If such use is exempted, 
the patent on the research tool would lose all of its value.291  In the 
 
 287. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 878 (Newman, J. dissenting). 
 288. Id. at 871-72, 878. 
 289. See also Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1035 (noting that allowing 
researchers an exemption when using so-called research tools “would plainly 
undermine the interest of the patent holder” and “thereby reduce incentives to 
make and disclose such inventions in the future.”). 
 290. See 331 F.3d at 878 (“There is a fundamental distinction between research 
into the science and technology disclosed in patents, and the use in research of 
patented products or methods, the so-called ‘research tools’ . . . Use of an existing 
[research] tool in one’s research is quite different from study of the tool itself.”). 
 291. See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1035 (noting a broader 
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face of a broader common-law experimental use exemption, the 
courts would have to closely distinguish between research done to 
improve the research tool itself and unrelated, infringing use of a 
patented research tool.  A further difficulty is to distinguish what 
constitutes a research tool and what does not—a point upon which 
the majority and dissent in Integra did not agree.292  Other than 
carefully distinguishing between a research tool and non-research 
tool, a broader experimental use exemption comports with the 
purpose of the patent system: to encourage scientific invention and 
technological innovation. 
A patent system with a broader experimental use exemption 
still rewards patentees with adequate protection, allowing them the 
sole right to commercialize their products and make a return on 
their investments.  At the same time, a broader experimental use 
exemption could accelerate the rate of improvements on patented 
subject matter and the creation of derivative products by giving 
other researchers free use of the invention to conduct further 
research.  This broader experimental use exemption should apply 
despite the researchers’ intentions to commercialize their research 
at a later date. 
3.  Limiting the Experimental Use Exemption 
This note advocates a broader experimental use exemption, 
one that would allow researchers to freely use patented subject 
matter in their research.  The broader exemption should apply 
even if a researcher may have a commercial purpose in mind.  
Unless the exemption has some limitations, however, unrestrained 
research could quickly turn into usurpation of a patentee’s rights 
when other researchers profit from the use of the patentee’s 
technology. 
The person researching a patented technology must not be 
allowed to commercialize or profit from the sale of the patentee’s 
invention during the patent term.  Allowing researchers to profit 
 
experimental use exemption should not apply to the use of research tools because 
such patents would have no value, thus eliminating the patent’s incentive and 
leading to a decline in the creation of research tools). 
 292. See 331 F.3d at 878.  The majority seems to hold that the RGD peptide was 
a research tool because the defendant Merck used the RGD peptide in their 
research.  Id. at 872 n.4.  Dissenting Judge Newman viewed the RGD peptides 
instead as “simply new compositions having certain biological properties” and 
characterized Merck’s activities as “syntheses and evaluations of new RGD 
peptides.”  Id. at 878. 
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from selling the patentee’s claimed invention would strip away 
some, if not most, of the incentive of obtaining a patent.  Once the 
competitor goes beyond research and begins to commercialize a 
product, the full force of the original patent must be in effect 
against the competitor.  In addition, some other limitations might 
be prudent. 
The range of possible limitations placed upon the research 
exemption includes: 1) exempting only non-commercial research, 
2) exempting all research from infringement, 3) exempting only 
research that is not “essentially derived from” or relies heavily on 
the patented invention,293 or 4) exempting all research, but 
imposing a reasonable royalty for commercialization of any non-
infringing derivative product. 
First, an experimental use exemption that exempts only non-
commercial research is the current state of the law294 and is too 
narrow.  As noted by commentators, infringement by non-
commercial researchers is rarely prosecuted.295  Thus, this rule has 
little if any usefulness. 
Second, allowing all research on patented subject matter to be 
exempt, even if the research has a commercial purpose, may 
decrease the incentive to invent.  Under such a rule, a researcher 
would be allowed to profit from his research if he creates a wholly 
non-infringing product.  If the researcher’s product derived from 
another’s patent is considered infringing on the patent, then the 
researcher would have to wait until after the patent expires to sell 
the derivative product.  The result is similar to designing around a 
patented invention, which is encouraged by courts.296  If the 
researcher’s product successfully “designs around” the patented 
invention, then the researcher can commercialize the new product 
and the patentee loses some, possibly all, of the patent monopoly 
power.  As argued above,297 such a rule might still provide ample 
incentive to invent and innovate, but it is the most severe and poses 
the greatest risk of decreasing the incentive to invent, as it gives 
researchers the strongest rights.298 
 
 293. This language is similar to and derived from the Plant Variety Patent Act, 
7 U.S.C. §§ 2541, 2544 (2003). 
 294. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 295. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1019. 
 296. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text. 
 297. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 298. See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1036 (hypothesizing that an 
exemption “[p]ermitting the unlicensed use of patented inventions for the 
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Third, exempting all research that is not “essentially derived 
from” or that relies heavily on a patented invention is similar to the 
rule created under the Plant Variety Protection Act.299  Such a rule 
would give the patentee more rights against researchers.  Under 
this rule, a researcher that creates a technically non-infringing 
product by relying heavily on the patented subject matter would 
still infringe the patent.  If the researcher, however, created a 
substantially different product than the patented one, he should 
not owe the patentee any royalties.  This rule would be fraught with 
ambiguity, difficult to formulate, and difficult to enforce.  Drawing 
the line between a product that relies heavily on the patent and 
one that does not would most likely be a hypertechnical 
application, resulting in difficulty for judges and juries.  Courts 
exert enough effort construing the patent claims and determining 
whether an accused infringing product falls within the claim 
construction.  Creating a rule where a product falls outside the 
scope of the respective patent’s claim construction but nevertheless 
infringes because it relied heavily on the patent during its 
development would be even more difficult to apply. 
The final solution is a more moderate approach, as it suggests 
creating some type of compulsory license if a researcher wants to 
commercialize a derivative product, regardless whether the 
derivative product infringes the patent.300  If the researcher made 
 
purpose of inventing around patents would appear to reduce the value of patents 
by shortening the term of effective commercial monopoly,” thus reducing the 
incentive to invent). 
 299. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2541(c)(1), 2544 (2003) (providing a research exemption, 
but also providing that plants “essentially derived from” a protected variety will be 
considered infringing).  See also J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534 
U.S. 124, 139-40 (2001). 
 300. This rule already has at least some support in academia.  See Eisenberg, 
Patents, supra note 17, at 1078.  Eisenberg recommends an experimental use 
exemption such that: 
A patent holder should not be entitled to enjoin the use of a patented 
invention in subsequent research in the field of the invention, which 
could potentially lead to improvements in the patented technology or 
to the development of alternative means of achieving the same 
purpose. However, it might be appropriate in some cases to award a 
reasonable royalty after the fact to be sure that the patent holder 
receives an adequate return on the initial investment in developing the 
patented invention. 
Id. 
See also Mueller, supra note 15, at 55-58 (supporting Eisenberg’s proposed rule and 
proposing a modified version for research tools); Karp, supra note 256, at 2187-88 
(arguing for an experimental use exemption that forces an experimenter to pay a 
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or used the patented subject matter during the course of the 
research, then the researcher would be liable upon 
commercialization of the derivative product to pay a reasonable 
royalty.  The royalty could be based on the extent of the use of the 
patented subject matter during research.  Because this rule ensures 
an after-the-fact payment to patentees, it is almost certain to 
continue to spur innovation on the part of inventors seeking 
patents.  The patentees could recoup some of their investment 
from the royalty paid for the use of the patented invention.  In 
addition, this rule allows free research without the fear of 
infringement charges until the researcher creates a commercialized 
product.  This suggested rule is fairly conservative because it gives 
patentees a financial reward in the form of royalties, yet promotes 
more research on already-patented subject matter. 
C.  Combining the Experimental Use Exemption and FDA Approval 
Safe Harbor Provision 
When a competitor conducts research on a patented product 
that also requires FDA approval, as was the case in Integra, the court 
should combine a broadened experimental use exemption with the 
FDA approval safe harbor provision.  In her dissenting opinion in 
Integra, Judge Newman states that any of Merck’s allegedly 
infringing activities that were not considered “research,” and thus 
not covered by the experimental use exemption, should be exempt 
from infringement under the FDA approval safe harbor 
provision.301  She argued that in cases where the product required 
FDA approval, the experimental use exemption and FDA approval 
safe harbor provision should flow seamlessly into one another so as 
to avoid an awkward period where the researcher would be liable 
for infringement when the activities directly before and after that 
period are exempt from infringement.302 
 
reasonable royalty to the patentee when the research “resulted in a benefit to the 
experimenter”). 
 301. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 877. 
 302. Id.  Judge Newman stated: 
[T]he territory that the Scripps/Merck research traversed, from 
laboratory experimentation to development of data for submission to 
the FDA, was either exempt exploratory research, or was immunized by 
§ 271(e)(1).  It would be strange to create an intervening kind of 
limbo, between exploratory research subject to exemption, and the 
FDA statutory immunity, where the patent is infringed. 
Id. 
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Judge Newman’s argument is both logical and practical.  When 
considering a product that requires FDA approval, it can be 
difficult to determine where the research ends and seeking FDA 
approval begins.  Once a product is chosen for submission to the 
FDA, the applicant may no longer be conducting research, so the 
experimental use exemption no longer applies.303  But when 
conducting research and development, the research phase 
probably ends and the development phase begins somewhere 
before the product is ready to submit to the FDA.304  The 
development stage is most likely, in the language of § 271(e)(1), 
“reasonably related” to seeking FDA approval and exempt from 
infringement.305  Either way, it would be unreasonable to permit the 
competing researcher free use of the patented subject matter for 
initial research and later exempt him from infringement while 
seeking FDA approval, while also enforcing the patent 
infringement in the gray area in between those two stages. 
The best rule, as Judge Newman stated, would allow all stages 
of research and development, from initial research to the final 
stages of FDA approval, to be exempt from infringement.  Such a 
rule will ensure maximum improvements, development, and 
innovation in the drug and medical device markets by allowing 
drug companies to freely conduct research on their competitors’ 
patents, even if the drug company fully intends to create a 
commercially viable product.  This liberal rule would also ensure 
that products derived from patented subject matter can be sent 
through the FDA approval process during the patent term and 
commercially exploited as soon as the original patent expires, thus 
furthering the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act.306  Allowing the 
competitive researcher to seek FDA approval on his derivative 
product under the safe harbor provision will also enable the 
researcher to test if his derivative product is even worthy of FDA 
approval. 
However, this rule could become difficult to apply if the 
experimental use exemption is coupled with a reasonable royalty 
for commercialization.  The question then becomes, “where does 
 
 303. See id. at 876.  Judge Newman drew the distinction between “research” 
and “development” and stated that the experimental use rule should apply to 
research, but submitting information to the FDA should be considered 
“development” and no longer exempt under the experimental use rule.  See id. 
 304. See id. at 877. 
 305. See infra Part II.B. 
 306. Id. 
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the experimental use exemption end and the FDA approval safe 
harbor provision begin?”  The difficulty lies in the fact that the 
proposed experimental use exemption period would require 
royalty payments, whereas the FDA approval safe harbor period is 
royalty-free.  One possibility is that the researcher would owe 
royalties until clinical testing begins.  In this case, the power of the 
FDA approval safe harbor would be somewhat lessened, but would 
be easier to administer.  Furthermore, companies such as Merck 
that are testing new derivative drugs would have more protection 
under an experimental use exemption.  Overall, allowing all stages 
of research and development to be exempt from patent 
infringement (including seeking FDA approval) produces more 
public benefit than public burden. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA 
has followed its prior precedents and narrowly construed the 
experimental use exemption to patent infringement.  However, this 
holding does not further patent law’s overriding goal of 
encouraging innovation.  Permitting free use of patented subject 
matter for further research would lead to faster improvements on 
existing and derivative products from patented technology.  But 
because the scope of the current experimental use exemption is 
fairly well established by the Federal Circuit, a legislative approach 
may be better suited to implement such a change.307 
If Congress or the federal courts were to broaden the 
experimental use exemption, the tough issue would be how far to 
broaden it.  A very broad exemption to infringement would allow 
researchers free use, but might reduce the incentive to invent, and 
thus, reduce the rate of invention.  The current scope of the 
experimental use exemption allows almost no one to conduct 
research without a license from the patentee, inhibiting 
independent research on patented subject matter.308  Little 
evidence is available to point to the optimal level of patent 
 
 307. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
739 (2002); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28 
(1997) (both stating that major changes to well-settled doctrines in patent law 
should be handled by Congress rather than the courts). 
 308. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (2002) (holding that 
even universities conducting educational research cannot invoke the experimental 
use exemption). 
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One thing is clear: research leads to new inventions, new 
discoveries, faster improvements, and more innovation.  Forcing 
researchers to seek licenses and to pay the patentee royalties to 
conduct research is counterproductive in a system that is meant to 
promote innovation.  Free research means more people will be 
financially able to conduct research, and more funds will be 
devoted to improvements rather than paying the patentee for 
known technology. 
A patent system that wants maximum innovation, requires full 
disclosure, and encourages designing around a patented invention 
should be more enthusiastic about a broader experimental use 
exemption.  Furthermore, an economy that favors free competition 
and is skeptical of monopolies should not be so quick to give 
patentees the utmost protection from competition without having 
concrete reasons for doing so. 
For now, a fairly conservative experimental use exemption 
would allow free use of patented subject matter for experimental 
use and would require researchers to pay a reasonable royalty only 
upon commercialization of derivative products.  In the future, an 
even stronger experimental use exemption without any royalties, 
similar to those in place in countries such as Japan or Germany, 
would likely still promote sufficient original innovation while 
strongly promoting follow-up inventions, designing around, and 
improvements to patented subject matter. 
 
 309. Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1030.  See also Eisenberg, Proprietary 
Rights, supra note 210, at 224.  The author states: 
The optimal extent of the experimental use defense cannot be 
determined without attention to its likely effects on the scientific 
community. Too narrow a defense could stifle basic research and 
impair the community’s mechanisms for validating and building upon 
new knowledge. Too broad a defense could cause industrial sponsors 
to lose interest in biotechnology research or to rely on secrecy in lieu 
of patent protection. There may be no way to avoid both of these 
potential problems completely. 
Id. 
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